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CIVIL RIGHTS PLAINTIFFS AND JOHN DOE
DEFENDANTS: A STUDY IN SECTION 1983
PROCEDURE
Howard M Wasserman*

INTRODUCTION:

A CIVIL (RIGHTS) ACTION

On May 10, Robert Hall was arrested in Baker County, Georgia on
a warrant charging him with theft of a tire. Deputy Sheriff Screws,
Special Deputy Kelley, and Police Officer Jones arrested Hall at his
home late in the evening, placing him in handcuffs and transporting him
by squad car to the county jail. As Hall emerged from the car,
apparently still with his hands cuffed behind his back, some or all of the
three officers began beating him with their fists and with an eight-inch,
two-pound blackjack. The beating continued after Hall had fallen to the
ground, for between fifteen and thirty minutes, until Hall lost
consciousness. Hall was dragged into the jail and left on the floor of the
cell. An ambulance later transported him to the hospital, where he died
within the hour, never regaining consciousness.'
Suppose that Hall left behind a wife, who wants to sue the
government and the public officials responsible for her husband's death
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 Section 1983 lacks its own limitations period;
* Assistant Professor, FIU College of Law. J.D., 1997, B.S., 1990, Northwestern University.
© 2003 Howard M. Wasserman. My thanks to Carol Rice Andrews, Edward Cooper, Larry
Garvin, Michael Gerhardt, Steven Gey, Harold Lewis, Greg Mitchell, Peter Oh, Benjamin
Priester, and Carl Tobias for their thoughts and reviews of earlier drafts. This paper was
presented to the faculties at Florida State University College of Law, Michigan State-DCL
College of Law, and Brooklyn Law School.
I The incident described is based on the facts of Screws v. UnitedStates, 325 U.S. 91, 92-93
(1945), in which the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of three officers for criminal civil
rights violations, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242. See Christopher A. Bracey, Truth andLegitimacy
in the American Criminal Process,90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 711-12 (2000); Christina
Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitution in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
661, 671-72 (1997) [hereinafter Whitman, Constitutional Torts]. The one minor change made in
setting this scenario is making Screws a deputy, when in fact he was the County Sheriff. The
reasons for this change will become clear. See discussion infra notes 158-62, 254 and
accompanying text.
2 Section 1983 is the codification of§ 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
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it borrows and incorporates the limitations period for personal injury
actions in the state in which the alleged violation occurred,3 two years in
Georgia. 4 On May 8 two years after Robert's death, two days prior to
the expiration of the limitations period, Mrs. Hall files a §1983 action in
federal district court naming as defendants Baker County and Sheriff's
Deputies John Doe 1-3. The Doe defendants are described in the body
of the Complaint as the officers who arrested, transported, and jailed
Robert Hall on the night of May 10 and who administered, aided in,
failed to prevent, and/or were present at the fatal beating. Neither Mrs.
Hall nor her attorney knows the names of the officers who were
involved in or present at the incident.
The Complaint alleges that the three Doe officers used excessive
force against Robert Hall, an unreasonable seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 5 The Complaint also alleges that the three officers
acted pursuant to an unwritten, generally accepted custom of Baker
County and the Sheriffs Department of using excessive force against
arrestees 6 and/or that the County had failed properly to train, supervise,
of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003); see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (stating that § 1983
came onto the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, a statute designed to provide a
remedy against state underenforcement of laws as to newly freed slaves); Myriam E. Gilles,
Breaking the Code ofSilence: Rediscovering "Custom" in Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80
B.U. L. REV. 17, 23 (2000).
3 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279 (1985); 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2003) (providing
that, where federal law does not establish a particular element necessary to furnish suitable
remedies, the law of the state in which the federal court sits shall be extended to govern the
litigation of the federal claim); West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) ("Inevitably our
resolution of cases or controversies requires us to close interstices in federal law from time to
time, but when it is necessary for us to borrow a statute of limitations for a federal cause of
action, we borrow no more than necessary."); see, e.g., Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. City &
County of San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that limitations period in
California is one year); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995)
(stating that limitations period in Texas is two years); Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 190 (3d
Cir. 1993) (stating that limitations period in Pennsylvania is two years); Dory v. Ryan, 999 F.2d
679, 681 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that limitations period in New York is three years).
4 See Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1987).
5 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) ("Where, as here, the excessive force
claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly
characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment ... " ); id. at 395 ("[A]ll
claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of
an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard .. "); Whitman, Constitutional Torts,
supra note 1, at 687 ("It may well be more frightening, more humiliating, to be subjected to a
strip search by police officers ... than it is to be the victim of a private battery or
imprisonment."). But see Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due
Process of Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 617, 627 (1997) ("Is it so clear that the use of force is a
'seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?').
6 See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell
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discipline, or otherwise control the three officers with regard to the
7
proper use of force on arrestees.
The Complaint was served on Baker County fourteen days later, on
May 22. The County, after receiving from the court two extensions of
time to answer or otherwise plead, files its Answer fifty days later
(sixty-four days after the Complaint was filed), on July 11.8 Forty days
later, on August 20, Mrs. Hall's counsel and the County Attorney meet
for a discovery conference, pursuant to Rule 26(f). 9 Mrs. Hall's counsel
requests that the County make its mandatory disclosures10 as quickly as
possible; she informs counsel for the County that she anticipates the
disclosures will reveal the names of the individual John Doe deputies
involved in the incident and that she wants to amend her complaint to
change the Doe designations. Mrs. Hall's lawyer also serves a First Set
of Interrogatories, asking for the names and addresses of the officers
who arrested Robert Hall or who were present at the jailhouse when he
was brought there on May 10.11
Fourteen days after the conference, on September 3 (118 days after
the lawsuit was commenced, 116 days after the Statute of Limitations
ran), the County makes its Rule 26(a) disclosures, identifying Deputy

v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Mark R. Brown, The
Failure of Fault Under § 1983: Municipal Liabilit for State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1503, 1512 n.57 (1999); Michael J. Gerhardt, Institutional Analysis of Municipal Liability
under Section 1983, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 669, 673 (1999); Gilles, supra note 2, at 29; Christina B.
Whitman, Government Responsibilityfor Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225, 237 (1986)
[hereinafter Whitman, Government Responsibility].
7 See Gilles, supra note 2, at 41-42 (describing the "failure to [blank]" model of municipal
liability as to police training, where the failure to train, supervise, or control is so obvious and so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipal action
leading the employer to violate the Constitution was taken with deliberate indifference to its
known consequences, where the need for more or different training is so obvious and its
inadequacy so likely to result in a constitutional violation); Karen M. Blum, Municipal Liability
Derivative or Direct? Statutory or Constitutional? Distinguishing the Canton Case from the
Collins Case, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 687, 695 (1999) (arguing that in failure-to-train cases there is
no question about the underlying constitutional violation by the employee, rather the issue is the
level of culpability the plaintiff must prove to demonstrate that the municipality "caused" the
violation); Brown, supra note 6, at 1512 n.57 (describing three ways of establishing local fault in
order to establish governmental liability).
8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A) (providing that party must file and serve an answer within
twenty days of receipt of service of a complaint and summons); see also Judith Resnik,
ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 384 (1982).[hereinafter Resnik, ManagerialJudges]
(stating that parties commonly stipulate to extend the deadline for a defendant to answer and that
"months would pass before a defendant filed a responsive pleading").
9 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(o (providing that parties "as soon as practicable" must confer to,
inter alia, consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and to make or arrange for
mandatory disclosures required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)).
10 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A) (providing for mandatory initial disclosures by each party
of, inter alia, the "name... of each individual likely to have discoverable information that the
disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses").
1 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
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Screws, Special Deputy Kelley, and Police Officer Jones as individuals
likely to have information supporting the County's legal and factual
defenses, based on their having been present at or involved in the
incident in question.1 2 Six days after that, on September 9, the County
answers Hall's interrogatories, identifying the same three officers as the
men who effected Hall's arrest and were present when Hall was
transported to the jail.
On September 5, 120 days after the Complaint was filed and 118
days after the two-year statute of limitations ran, Mrs. Hall moves for
leave to amend her Complaint, replacing Deputies John Doe 1-3 with
Screws, Kelley, and Jones as named party defendants. 13 A copy of the
proposed Amended Complaint is attached as an exhibit to the motion,
which is personally served on the County and on the three individual
officers. Screws, Kelley, and Jones oppose the motion, arguing that
14
leave to file the Amended Complaint should be denied as futile,
because the two-year limitations period for bringing constitutional
claims against them expired on May 10, four months prior to the
15
proposed pleading.
Resolution of the motion for leave to amend depends on the
interpretation and application of the doctrine of relation back. Under
Rule 15(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party not
named in an original Complaint may be named in an Amended
Complaint, even after the applicable limitations period has expired; the
claims in the Amended Complaint "relate back" and are deemed filed as
part of the original, pre-limitations filing.' 6 The basic requirements are
that the added defendants have notice within 120 days of the filing of
the lawsuit, that the lawsuit has been filed, that they are intended targets
of the lawsuit, and that only a "mistake concerning the identity of the
proper party" prevented them from being named in the original

12 See Bracey, supra note 1, at 711 (discussing Screws, in which officers' defense was that
Mr. Hall had reached for a gun and used insulting language as he alighted from the car).
13 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (providing that, once a responsive pleading has been filed, "a
party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court .. and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires.").
14 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (defining circumstances in which leave to
amend a pleading can be denied, including "futility of amendment").
15 The example here is fairly basic and straightforward procedurally, particularly in the
manner of pleading and service and the process of disclosure and discovery, most notably in
supposing the County will be diligent in the extreme in its discovery obligations.
16 See Robert D. Brussack, OutrageousFortune: The casefor Amending Rule 15(c) Again, 61
S. CAL. L. REv. 671, 674 (1988) (describing "legal fiction" of relation back); Harold S. Lewis,
Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85

MICH. L. REv. 1507, 1511 (1987) (arguing that relation back rules "breathe new life into
lawsuits"); Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for FederalCivil Procedure to Recognize
John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 883, 898 (1996) ("Relation back is a fiction that saves an

otherwise late amendment to a pleading.").
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Complaint. 17
The last point is the crux of the Rule 15(c) puzzle. Nearly every
federal court of appeals has concluded, in circumstances comparable to
Mrs. Hall's, that the Amended Complaint cannot relate back to the
original time of filing.' 8 A mistake as to the identity of the proper
defendant means an affirmative misapprehension, misstatement, or
misunderstanding about the identity of the proper defendant; mistake
does not mean ignorance or lack of knowledge as to the defendant's
20
identity. 19 Commentators generally agree.
The action arising from Robert Hall's death illustrates the special
problem created by this understanding and application of mistake in §
1983 actions. The use of John Doe or Unknown Officer pleading is

17 Rule 15(c) provides in relevant part as follows:
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period
provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint [120 days, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)], the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received
such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in
maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but
for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have
been brought against the party.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or United States
Attorney's designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or
officer who would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph (3) with respect to the United States or
any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant.
Id. See discussion infra notes 74-105 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11 th Cir. 1999); Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133
F.3d 315, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1998); Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466, 469-70 (2d
Cir. 1996); Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1257 (7th Cir. 1993). But see Varlack v. SWC
Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1977) (reaching opposite conclusion and permitting
relation back where plaintiff replaced "Unknown Employee" with proper name of unknown
defendant in Amended Complaint); see also Brussack, supra note 16, at 692 (arguing that
Varlack is a better approach). But see Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186,
200-01 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (calling Varlack into question and calling for an amendment to Rule
15(c)).
19 See Wayne, 197 F.3d at 1103 ("[W]e do not read the word 'mistake' to mean 'lack of
knowledge."'); Barrow, 66 F.3d at 470 ("[F]ailure to identify individual defendants when the
plaintiff knows that such defendants must be named cannot be characterized as a mistake.");
Worthington, 8 F.3d at 1257 (holding that where plaintiff's failure to name defendants "was due
to a lack of knowledge as to their identity, and not a mistake in their names," plaintiff was
prevented from availing himself of relation back doctrine).
20 See Edward Cooper, Rule 15(c)(3) Puzzles 3 (Unpublished Manuscript on file with Author)
("The plaintiff knew from the beginning that he did not know the identity of the proper
defendants. This was ignorance, not mistake."); Rice, supra note 16, at 927 ("A Doe allegation
simply is not a mistake."); see discussion infra notes 106-49 and accompanying text.
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most common 2 1 and most necessary in these cases, in light of 1) the
conduct that gives rise to much constitutional litigation, 22 and 2)
substantive § 1983 law, which emphasizes the liability of the individual
officer and de-emphasizes or eliminates the liability of the government
entity. 23 Mrs. Hall is unable to identify the individual officers and name
them as defendants without the benefit of formal discovery, but cannot
get formal discovery until after she files the lawsuit. 24 Without the
benefit of relation back, her claims against the three officers are barred
by the statute of limitations. Further, given substantive law that makes

25
it unlikely she can establish liability against Baker County as an entity,

Mrs. Hall will be deprived of any remedy and of any opportunity to
hold state actors to answer for their constitutional misconduct. Such a
result defeats the twin substantive aims of § 1983--compensating
individuals for the deprivation of their constitutional

rights 26 and

27
deterring future unconstitutional conduct by those officers and others.
This substantive outcome results from a narrow interpretation and
application of a procedural rule, contradicting the notion that stringent
procedure should not defeat substance. 28 Rather, a civil rights plaintiff
such as Mrs. Hall should be able to discover the names of the target

21 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that the need to plead a John Doe is common in §
1983 actions); Rice, supra note 16, at 895 ("Civil rights cases against unknown law enforcement
officers, the most frequent uses of the Doe defendant in federal courts, best illustrates this
reality."); id. at 886-87 (stating that Bivens was one of the first and most obvious uses of an
unknown defendant). See discussion infra note 150 and accompanying text. Our discussion
focuses on § 1983 actions against state and local governments and officers as well as the
counterpart claim against federal officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
FederalBureau of Narcotics,403 U.S. 388 (1971).
22 See discussion infra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
23 See John C. Jefferies, Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REV. 47, 59 (1998) (arguing that the liability scheme forces civil rights plaintiffs to sue state
officers rather than governments themselves and that municipal liability is a narrow deviation
from the general rule of individual liability based on fault); see also Jack M. Beermann,
Municipal Responsihility for Constitutional Torts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 627 (1999) ("The
fundamental principle in the law of municipal liability under § 1983 is that municipalities may be
held liable only for their own conduct, not for the conduct of municipal employees."); see
discussion infra notes 156-74 and accompanying text.
24 See Rice, supra note 16, 896-97 n.39
25 See discussion infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
26 See Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 1, at 693 ("Damage relief becomes
important, not because every official mistake should be corrected, or even because every violation
of the Constitution should be remedied, but because, without the right to sue for compensation,
certain sorts of abuse of power will entirely escape judicial scrutiny.").
27 See Brown, supra note 6, at 1529-30; Gilles, supra note 2, at 33; see discussion infra notes
36-39 and accompanying text.
28 See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2050-51 (1989)
(criticizing procedure that defeats rather than vindicates congressionally created rights); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the rules shall be "administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action"); see discussion infra notes 43-51 and accompanying
text.
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individual officer defendants in sufficient time that she can bring them
into a federal court action and proceed to a determination of the merits
of her claim, vindicating the substantive rights and interests guaranteed
by § 1983 and the Constitution.
We might ensure that such plaintiffs are not left without a remedy
30
by making changes to litigation strategy, 29 to substantive § 1983 law,
31
or to Rule 15(c) and the relation back doctrine.
However, those
solutions, while perhaps effective in Mrs. Hall's case, suffer from
shortcomings that render each, standing alone, a less-than-complete
solution. 32 This problem demands a fourth option, a procedural
mechanism that permits a potential plaintiff to obtain formal discovery
from the government entity or agency as to the identities of individual

officer defendants prior to commencing litigation and prior to the
expiration of the statute of limitations.
Discovery ordinarily is available only after a lawsuit has been
initiated. 33 The limited exception to this is Rule 27, which permits a
person who anticipates filing a lawsuit but is not quite ready to do so to
depose a witness for the purpose of "perpetuating" testimony or

evidence.3 4 A new procedure modeled on Rule 27 would enable a
potential § 1983 plaintiff, prior to filing her Complaint, to depose the
government entity for the limited purpose of learning the identities of

the officers who could be proper defendants. The government would
not be named as a party in any ultimate lawsuit, but would be used

solely as a non-party witness for discovering preliminary information
necessary for the plaintiff to commence her action. The identities can
be learned through a short deposition of a government designee with
29 See discussion infra notes 177-97 and accompanying text.
30 See Beermann, supra note 23, at 666 ("[F]airness concerns, as well as the policies
underlying § 1983, point toward a rule of vicarious liability."); see discussion infra notes 198220 and accompanying text.
31 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 5, 9 (arguing for amendment to "mistake or lack of
information"); Rice, supra note 16, at 953; Rebecca S. Engrav, Comment, Relation Back of
Amendments Naming Previously Unnamed Defendants Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(c), 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1549, 1586 (2001) (proposing new standard of "knew or should have
that, but for the movant's lack of knowledge of the proper party, or a mistake concerning the
identity of the party .. ") (emphasis added); see also Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr.,
266 F.3d 186, 201-02 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001); see discussion infra notes 221-36 and accompanying
text.
32 See discussion infra notes 251-84 and accompanying text.
33 See Rice, supra note 16, at 896 ("He cannot get the court's help in identifying the officer
until he files suit .. "); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (providing that, unless otherwise ordered
by the district court, discovery cannot be sought by a party until the parties have conferred).
34 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1) ("A person who desires to perpetuate testimony regarding any
matter that might be cognizable in any court of the United States may file a verified petition in the
United States district court in the district of the residence of any expected adverse party.");
Application of Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione, 198 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Rule
27 is a means of perpetuating testimony before trial."); see discussion infra notes 287-92 and
accompanying text.
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knowledge of the relevant officers or through the production of
documents indicating the officers involved in a particular incident at a
35
particular time and place.
Armed with the identities of the responsible officers, the plaintiff
can sue them by name in the timely original Complaint, obviating the
need for John Doe pleading, for amending pleadings, or for having to
satisfy requirements for relation back. This narrow rule, motivated by
the unique problem of unknown defendants in § 1983 actions (although
not limited only to civil rights cases), provides the most viable solution
to the John Doe problem, one with fewer problems than Rule 15centered mechanisms.
Part I of this Article examines the intersection between procedure
and substance and between the rules of civil procedure and civil rights
litigation, including the theoretical wisdom and propriety of creating
substance-specific procedural rules. Part II examines Rule 15(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the current requirements for
relation back, particularly the way in which courts and commentators
have approached the meaning of the word "mistake" and the problems
this interpretation poses for civil rights plaintiffs. Part III discusses in
detail five possible mechanisms for identifying and proceeding against
unknown officer defendants under § 1983, including the defects and
benefits of each, concluding that the creation and use of a pre-filing
discovery mechanism provides the best solution.
I.

SECTION

1983 AND

THE SUBSTANCE/PROCEDURE LINK

The primary, basic purposes of § 1983 and Bivens are deterring
future government and official misconduct and abuse of power and
compensating victims for past constitutional deprivations. 36 These twin
35 See discussion infra notes 293-319 and accompanying text.
36 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) ("The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state
actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed
rights and to provide relief if such deterrence fails."); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 49 (1983)
(stating that "deterrence of future egregious conduct is a primary purpose" of § 1983); Qwen v.
City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (citations omitted) ("The central aim of the Civil
Rights Act was to provide protection to those persons wronged by the '[m]isuse of power,
possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law."'); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) ("[T]he basic purpose of
a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation
of constitutional rights .
"); see also Beermann, supra note 23, at 646; Brown, supra note 6, at
1529-30; Gilles, supranote 2, at 29, 33; Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory
Liability in Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 147, 150 (1997); Sheldon Nahmod, From
the Courtroom to the Street: Court Orders and Section 1983, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 613, 637
n. 108 (2002) [hereinafter Nahmod, Courtroom] ("The damages remedy functions not only to
deter unconstitutional conduct, but also to compensate innocent people as a matter of corrective
justice."); Wells, supra note 5, at 620 (arguing that the real change wrought by the revival of §
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aims go unsatisfied when a plaintiff, such as Mrs. Hall, has no
potentially liable public defendant against which to timely plead and
proceed, leaving her unable to recover damages for constitutional
injuries.37 And there is no reason to believe that, in the absence of
successful litigation against some person or institution, Baker County
will take steps to prevent or avoid future similar incidents between its
officers and other citizens. 38 Moreover, § 1983 plaintiffs, even
individual damages plaintiffs, assume the role of private attorneys
general, aiding the enforcement of federal law against state violators
and furthering the public good through their private civil actions. 39 But
a plaintiff cannot perform that role if she lacks the ability to find and
sue a proper defendant.
Mrs. Hall is deprived of the opportunity to plead against Screws,
Kelley, and Jones because courts interpret and apply "mistake" and

1983 damages actions was to get courts thinking in constitutional terms about injuries that took
place in the past and that had no bearing on any other legal obligation owed by or to the victim);
Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts, supra note 1, at 691 ("When there are no judicial mechanisms to
impose sanctions on isolated incidents .. , similar incidents can accumulate and become intrinsic
to the functioning of the law enforcement system without any formal articulation of policy.").
37 See Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 1, at 693 ("Damage relief becomes
important, not because every official mistake should be corrected, or even because every violation
of the Constitution should be remedied, but because without the right to sue for compensation,
certain sorts of abuse of power will entirely escape judicial scrutiny.").
38 See Beermann, supra note 23, at 646 (arguing that broader municipal liability improves
deterrence of governmental misconduct); Brown, supra note 6, at 1523 (arguing that even
overdeterrence of unconstitutional behavior is a general societal good); id at 1529 (arguing that
the payment of constitutional judgments through tax dollars does guarantee the public more
responsible government); Gilles, supra note 2, at 31 (arguing that the § 1983 liability scheme
should make it more likely that the government will take steps to remedy the problems); Harold
S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping Section 1983"s Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
755, 756-57 (1992) ("[T]he deprivation of a federally guaranteed right by government action is
uniquely damaging and therefore demands remedies of potent deterrent impact."); Sheldon
Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719, 1750
(1989) [hereinafter Nahmod, Discourse](arguingthat § 1983 litigation takes a prominent role in
promoting the public good).
39 See Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the PrivateAttorney General,2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 183,
186 ("The idea behind the 'private attorney general' can be stated relatively simply: Congress can
It
vindicate important public policy goals by empowering private individuals to bring suit ....
consists of providing a cause of action for individuals who have been injured by the conduct
Congress wishes to proscribe .. "); id. at 187 ("[T]his public function exists even when a civil
rights plaintiff asks for compensatory damages rather than injunctive relief."); see also Brown,
supra note 6, at 1529 ("The private attorneys general that § 1983 created are an important check
on state and local government."); Robert L. Carter, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure as a
Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2189 (1989) (emphasizing the need to
protect the "institution of the private attorney general," the private attorney who undertakes the
vindication of public rights); id at 2185 ("Congress has created. .. private rights of action under
a variety of statutes which are thought to be so vital as to justify enhanced enforcement, above
and beyond that which the Executive branch is able or willing to undertake."); Carl Tobias, Civil
Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801, 811 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil
Rights] (arguing that Congress envisioned plaintiffs acting as "private attorneys general
vindicating civil rights of many citizens who are not before the court").
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Rule 15(c)(3) in a constricted manner. 40 In other words, a procedural
rule is interpreted in a manner that hinders or defeats the full realization
of the substantive purposes and benefits of § 1983,41 even though the
Federal Rules generally are to be interpreted and applied so as to ensure
the just resolution of legal claims. 42 The application of a procedural

rule becomes suspect if it defeats clearly articulated substantive
principles. 43 Similarly, the search for new procedures must consider the
44
intersection between procedure and substance.
The irony of focusing on that intersection in the realm of § 1983 is
that constitutional damages actions were unknown to the framers of the
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. 45

The original

paradigm for the civil rules was the basic diversity case, a tort or
contract dispute between two private individuals or businesses, each
represented by private counsel, seeking money damages. 46 The rise of
federal social legislation in the 1960s and 1970s changed that
paradigm. 47 Constitutional litigation under § 1983 must be understood
40 See discussion supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text, see discussion infra notes 106-49
and accompanying text.
41 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 3-4 (arguing that the denial of relation back in Doe cases
"seems strange"); Rice, supra note 16, at 958 (arguing that, under current Rule 15(c), "the
plaintiff may not be able to hold the proper party responsible for the wrongs he suffered").
42 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the Rules "shall be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."); see also Joseph P. Bauer,
Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-aleIllustration of the Supreme Court's Role as Interpreter of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720, 730 (1988) (arguing that the
Court's task in interpreting the federal rules must bear in mind the general rule of construction in
Rule 1); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the FederalRules of
Civil Procedure,44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1040 (1993) ("[Tihe failure to heed this admonition...
may result in an unduly stingy interpretation of a Rule ..
"). But see Patrick Johnston,
Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325, 1375-76 (1995) ("References to the Rule 1 trinity and
'liberal' interpretations of other Rules to secure resolution on the merits can be misleading .... ").
43 See Subrin, supra note 28, at 2050-51 (criticizing procedure that defeats rather than
vindicates congressionally created rights); see also Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2219, 2219 (1989) [hereinafter Resnik, Domain] ("[W]e cannot and should not ignore
the political content and consequences of procedural rules.").
44 See David. A. Hyman, When Rules Collide: ProceduralIntersection and the Rule of Law,
71 TUL. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (1997) ("Procedure is the ways and means of substantive law. By
specifying the mechanisms for administrative enforcement and judicial review, procedure helps
ensure the outcome dictated by the substantive law.").
45 See Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 512 (1986) [hereinafter Resnik, FailingFaith] (stating that the 1930s, when original Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were drafted, was an era before the rise of civil rights litigation).
46 See id. at 508.
47 See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 284-85 (1989) [hereinafter Tobias, Public Law Litigation] (discussing
"social legislation," including measures proscribing discrimination in education, employment,
and housing, which encouraged suits by the intended beneficiaries); Carl Tobias, The
Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1501, 1502 (1992) [hereinafter
Tobias, Transformation] (arguing that social legislation erodes trans-substantivity through their
distinctive purposes and procedures); see also Carter, supra note 39, at 2182 (describing the rise
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as part of this change. Although enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, § 1983 was not brought to life until nearly a century later,
when the Supreme Court for the first time recognized a plaintiffs right
to recover damages for the misconduct of public officers acting under
the cloak of their authority as state actors, even where their conduct was
not formally permitted or ratified by state law. 48 That revival continued
into the late 1970s, when the Court first recognized at least limited
municipal liability under § 1983. 49

Constitutional actions against

individual federal officers for money damages were unknown until
1971.50
The premise of civil rights litigation is that private plaintiffs should

use judicial procedure as a vehicle for vindicating substantive rights,
thereby vindicating the substantive purposes of the law and the public
interest. 51 On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

reflect the ascension of trans-substantivity, the ideal that one general,

of "public law litigation," including challenges to the actions of legislative bodies and state and
federal administrative agencies); Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 45, at 512 (arguing that
"public law" lawsuits have fueled debate about procedural reform); Tobias, Public Law
Litigation, supra note 47, at 280 (describing public law litigation as disputes over the conduct or
content of public policy and the violation of some right by that policy).
48 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (holding that plaintiff could recover
damages under § 1983 even where municipal officer acted randomly, individually, and in
violation of state law); id. at 184-85 (defining "under color of law" under § 1983 as "[m]isuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law") (discussing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) and
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)); see also Gilles, supra note 2, at 23-24 (describing
dormancy of § 1983 for a century, until the courts moved away from a narrow understanding of
what action is "under color" of state law); id. at 25 ("In essence, Monroe opened every
unconstitutional action taken in official capacity to a potential § 1983 claim against the offending
officer."); Wells, supra note 5, at 620 ("Before Monroe and the revival of § 1983, there was no
point in thinking in constitutional terms about an injury that took place in the past .... ");
Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 1, at 667 ("By recognizing an action for damages,
Monroe created a new incentive to sue and made constitutional litigation available to a new class
of claimants.").
49 See Monell v, New York Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Gilles, supra note
2, at 28; see discussion infra notes 156-64 and accompanying tbxt.
50 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971) (holding that, where a complaint against federal law enforcement officers states a
cause of action under the Fourth Amendment, he is entitled to recover money damages for any
injuries suffered as a result of the agents' constitutional violations); id. at 410 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) ("For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing.").
51 See Karlan, supra note 39, at 186 ("Congress can vindicate important public policy goals
by empowering private individuals to bring suit."); Nahmod, Courtroom, supra note 36, at 642
(arguing that § 1983 "provides a meaningful opportunity to characterize a defendant's conduct as
blameworthy, thereby emphasizing the importance of corrective justice and individual
responsibility"); Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 47, at 285 ("A number of enactments
encouraged suit by their intended beneficiaries such as those individuals or groups subject to
discrimination."); id. at 282 (describing public interest litigation that "vindicates the ideological,
political, or moral interests of numerous persons in attempting to insure that institutions behave
lawfully"); Tobias, Transformation,supra note 47, at 1502 (arguing that plaintiffs vindicate the
substantive purposes of civil rights legislation).
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neutral set of procedural rules properly and coherently could apply
across the full range of cases brought in federal court. 52 This idea has
come under attack in part out of recognition that facially neutral
procedural rules often have disparate negative impact on certain classes
of cases and litigants, notably civil rights cases and litigants. 53 This
disparate impact suggests that some substantive interests should be
favored with, in Paul Carrington's words, a "legislated thumb on the
procedural scales. ' 54 Procedural rules may account for substance,
facilitating the plaintiffs vindication of congressionally created
substantive rights, particularly in light of the remedial purposes of an
enactment such as § 1983. 55 And even a generally neutral, trans52 See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO L.J. 887, 889 (1999) (arguing that court-centered
rulemaking was justified by the idea that civil process is normatively independent of substance);
Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism
of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2074
(1989) [hereinafter Carrington, Making Rules] ("Neutrality with respect to the interests of
particular groups of disputants is an obvious objective, indeed perhaps of paramount value, of any
enterprise engaged in dispute resolution."); id. at 2079 (arguing that procedural rulemakers should
work behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance"); Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some
Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975) (arguing that the Rules
expressed "trans-substantive values"); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The
Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 778 (1993) [hereinafter Marcus, Of
Babies and Bathwater] ("A shift away from trans-substantive procedure would erode or eliminate
the positive effect of applying procedural learning from one substantive area to another.");
Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 45, at 512 (arguing that the framers of the original Rules relied
on a paradigm of private damages actions, which made a single trans-substantive set of rules
appealing and possible); id. ("With a single paradigm, it is easier to overlook the saliency of the
distinctions among various kinds of cases and hence to underestimate the need for rulemaking to
take variation into account."); Tobias, Transformation, supra note 47, at 1502 (describing "transsubstantive vision that most drafters of the original Federal Rules apparently held in 1938");
Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 47, at 274 ("The Committee intended the Rules as a
whole to provide a 'trans-substantive code of procedure' . . . procedure generalized across
substantive lines.").
53 See Bone, supra note 52, at 900 (arguing that the increase in federal civil rights litigation
"gave rise to concerns about the adequacy of the existing procedural system to promote
substantive values"); id. at 909 ("[M]ost critics focus on the distribution of outcomes and, in
particular, on distributions that systematically disadvantage particular classes of litigants.");
Carter, supra note 39, at 2182 ("[P]articular classes of substantive claims consistently receive less
favorable treatment than others at the hands of those rules."); Subrin, supra note 28, at 2043
("[A]bsolute standard may prejudice different cases. Such thinking leads to non-trans-substantive
rules.").
54 Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 52, at 2086 ("[Clongress may be justified in
building into substantive enactments specific procedural provisions.").
55 See Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 45, at 547 ("[W]e need to determine what subsets of
cases require special kinds of rules, and write rules for those kinds of cases."); Subrin, supra note
28, at 2051 ("If legislators want the rights proclaimed in statutes translated into real gains for
citizens they will have to consider some procedural incidents when they enact laws."); Tobias,
Transformation, supra note 47, at 1502 (arguing that a court should facilitate the plaintiffs
vindication of substantive purposes by affording procedural benefits to parties who seek to
vindicate those rights); id, at 1507 (arguing that Congress intended through substantive provisions
to afford potential litigants certain procedural advantages); see also Bone, supra note 52, at 933
(describing the rights-based metric, which defines the value of outcome-accuracy in terms of the
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substantive procedural system recognizes the efficacy and necessity of
56
some limited, narrow, substance-specific rules.
At the very least, procedural rules ought not have disparate impact
against civil rights plaintiffs. 57 Such impact results in non-enforcement
(or under-enforcement) of civil rights legislation; plaintiffs and their
attorneys are unable to bring successful claims, resulting in an increase
in the harms that the laws were designed to remedy and a decrease in
the intended benefits of enforcement. 58 The unavailability of relation
back in Doe defendant cases under § 1983 brings the point into stark
relief. The prevailing interpretation of mistake in Rule 15(c)(3)(B)
denies relation back in many Doe cases, defeating a greater number of §
1983 cases at the pleading or amendment stage. 59 Recognizing this
differential effect should motivate rules changes to ameliorate the
60
impact on substantive policy.
moral value of protecting individual rights); Carter, supra note 39, at 2184 (arguing that the
principal purpose of Federal Rules was vindication of substantive rights).
56 See Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 52, at 2068-69 ("There are and will continue to
be many significant variations in the uses made of procedure rules in different kinds of cases,
including some noncontroversial accommodations to differences in the substantive natures of
matters in dispute."); id. at 2079-80 (emphasizing the limited application of special rules);
Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater, supra note 52, at 778-79 (arguing that the critique of transsubstantivity "does not reject the general idea of a common model of procedure for most or all
cases, but only asks that special circumstances be noted.").
57 See Marcus, O Babies and Bathwater, supra note 52, at 776 ("The judgment to be made,
therefore, is whether some adjustment in the general procedural regime should be undertaken to
ameliorate the impact on a particular group."); Subrin, supra note 28, at 2050-51 (criticizing
procedure that defeats rather than vindicates congressionally created rights); Tobias, Civil Rights,
supra note 39, at 801 (arguing that procedural decision making has "adversely affected civil
rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs, who Congress intended to serve as private
attorneys general").
58 See Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 39, at 811 ("The [procedural] developments have
made it increasingly difficult for individuals and groups who believe that they have suffered
discrimination to institute, continue and win civil rights suits, as well as maintain any victories
secured."); Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure:Are the
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1920 (1989) (arguing that if
procedural rules defeat civil rights claims, "those behaving in the shadow of the law will risk
inflicting more insidious discrimination").
59 See Rice, supra note 16, at 895 ("Civil rights cases against unknown law enforcement
officers, the most frequent use of the Doe defendant in federal courts, best illustrates this
reality."); see discussion infra notes 151-75 and accompanying text.
60 One previous source of disparate substantive impact was the version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
in place from 1983 to 1993, which imposed mandatory sanctions on parties and attorneys for
failing to conduct sufficient pre-filing investigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) ("If a
pleading.., is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose.., an appropriate sanction ....
");Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of
American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1932 (1989)
[hereinafter Burbank, Transformation];Carter, supra note 39, at 2191. Commentators suggested
the 1983 rule had a disproportionately adverse impact on civil rights plaintiffs. See Burbank,
Transforming, supra, at 1938 (discussing results of one-year study of Rule 11 cases in Third
Circuit, showing civil rights lawyers sanctioned at far higher rate than for plaintiffs as a whole or
non-civil rights plaintiffs); id ("[I1f we find that § 1983 actions constitute a disproportionately
large slice of the Rule 11 pie, [we should] consider whether they have characteristics that render
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Beyond neutrality, the Federal Rules reflect what Richard Marcus
calls the "liberal ethos," the ideal that lawsuits should be resolved on
their merits by the trier of fact after an opportunity for discovery and
that courts should eschew procedural details in deciding cases. 61 The
idea was to make the filing of cases easier. 62 It follows that a plaintiff
must have a genuine opportunity to timely plead against potentially
63
liable defendants.
The most obvious manifestation of the liberal ethos is notice
pleading, which lowers the hurdles to the initiation of an action and
permits plaintiffs to pass through pleading and into fact discovery under
court supervision. 64 A liberal approach to relation back achieves that
this or that approach to the interpretation of Rule 11 or to the selection of a sanction more
appropriate than some other[.]"); Carter, supra note 39, at 2191 ("[Iln application, amended Rule
11 has not been wielded neutrally, but rather has exhibited a substantive bias against civil rights
claimants."); Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 47, at 303 ("[J]udges have applied Rule
1I 'zealously against plaintiffs in "disfavored" lawsuits[.]"'). In amending Rule 11 in 1993, the
Rules Advisory Committee stated that the amendment was "intended to remedy problems that
have arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the rule," particularly by
placing greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory
Committee's note to 1993 Amendment.
61 See Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater, supra note 52, at 766; Richard L. Marcus, The
Revival of Fact Pleading under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM. L. REV. 433,
439 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus, Fact Pleading]; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and
Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 853 (1993)
[hereinafter Burbank, Ignorance] (describing federal procedural system as one of"open access to
the courts"); Resnik, FailingFaith,supra note 45, at 497 (noting early arguments about the "need
to foster judicial decisions 'on the merits' by simplifying procedure"); id. at 501 (arguing that
framers of the rules "insisted on abandoning technicalities so as to enable consideration of the
merits of individuals' claims"); Resnik, Domain, supra note 43, at 2221 (agreeing that some of
the push behind the 1938 Rules intended to make the filing of cases easier and to enable
dispositions on the merits); id. at 2226 (describing values embodied in procedural systems that
stress getting to the merits); Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 47, at 286-87 ("[T]he
liberal ethos pervading the Rules as a whole and the liberality and flexibility that equity fostered
in specific Rules enabled public interest litigants to institute suit, successfully resist preliminary
motions, conduct broad discovery, and reach the merits of their claims."); Weinstein, supra note
58, at 1920 ("Parties could no longer rely on clever maneuvers, but were required to make their
best cases on the merits and face a dispositive ruling or a trial."); cf Marcus, Of Babies and
Bathwater, supra note 52, at 785 (arguing that the liberal ethos fits with a neutralist view of
procedure),
62 See Resnik, Domain, supra note 43, at 2221 ("[T]he rule drafters intended to provide ready
access to a variety of litigants who are now being closed out."); id. at 2220 (arguing for a system
of federal rules that provides "ready access to courts and the opportunity for the heretofore silent
to make new claims of legal right"); Weinstein, supra note 58, at 1906 (arguing that the "Federal
Rules were intended by their drafters to open wide the courthouse doors" and to provide every
claimant a "meaningful day in court"); id. at 1920 ("The advent of the Federal Rules swung the
courthouse door open.").
63 Cf Marcus, Fact Pleading, supra note 61, at 492 ("The real question is whether pleading
practice can yield reliable merits decisions.").
64 See Burbank, Transformation, supra note 60, at 1943 (describing a "system in which
pleading was to play a relatively minor, and not often dispositive, role in the definition or
resolution of disputes brought to federal court"); Marcus, Fact Pleading, supra note 61, at 440
("Rather than dwell on pleading niceties, under the new system litigants were to use the expanded
discovery mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules to get to the merits of the case."); Richard
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same end, broadening the plaintiffs ability to plead and proceed to
discovery and a determination on the merits against all defendants,
65
particularly those defendants identified relatively late in the process.
So, too, does a procedural mechanism that enables a plaintiff to timely
plead and proceed on the merits in cases in which the identity of the
target defendant cannot be discovered at the outset or becomes known
only through discovery after the limitations period has expired.
Finally, trans-substantivity assumes a procedural rulemaking
system in which the identities of the parties to the action and their
respective litigation positions are unknown in advance and
interchangeable-a system in which one never knows whether one will
be a plaintiff or defendant in a given case and in which one might be
plaintiff in one case and defendant in the next. 66 The converse of this
model informs criminal procedure rulemaking, where rules are drafted
knowing, in advance, the respective roles of each party.
The
government, the critical repeat player in the system, always will be
prosecuting; individuals, often proceeding with government-appointed
counsel, always will be on the defensive. Rulemakers consider what
rules will be beneficial to each side, as well as wealth, resource, and
power imbalances existing between those parties; rules often are drafted
67
to reflect or remedy those locked-in positions or imbalances.
The criminal rules model is more applicable to § 1983, where
parties have similarly pre-determined roles. 68 The defendant, by
definition, will be a government official and/or government entity, both
represented by government counsel, creating a cast of repeat players on

L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistenceof PleadingPractice, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1749, 1756 (1998)
[hereinafter Marcus, Puzzling Persistence] (arguing that pleading practice serves to enable
disposition on the merits, by helping to weed out weak claims and focus the litigation only on
viable claims); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
(holding that the Federal Rules do not require a detailed complaint, only such that will "give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests").
65 See Bauer, supra note 42, at 731 (arguing that courts must recognize that the "purpose of
Rule 15(c). . . is to ensure that an action should proceed if the intended defendant receives timely
notice of the nature and pendency of the action against it and also to ensure that the merits of the
claim should not be foreclosed because of this 'procedural error."').
66 See Resnik, Domain, supra note 43, at 2225 ("[I]n theory, one never knows in advance in a
civil case whether one will be a plaintiff or defendant that in one case, a particular litigant may be
a plaintiff, while in the next a defendant."); Resnik, FailingFaith,supra note 45, at 508 (arguing
that the dominant paradigm of the 1938 Rules was contract and tort cases in which the positions
of parties could change from case to case); see generally Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come
Out Ahead. Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974)
(describing the litigation process as featuring both "one-shot" and "repeat players").
67 See Resnik, Domain, supra note 43, at 2222-23; id.at 2224 (arguing that it is widely
recognized that the Department of Justice, the critical repeat player in the federal criminal justice
system, must be satisfied with a proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure in order for a
change to go forward).
68 Id.at 2225 ("[I]n a substantial category of cases we can know up front the identity of those
who will be the 'plaintiffs' and the 'defendants."').
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the defense side. 69 The plaintiff will be a private individual asserting a
claim arising from some contentious or adversarial encounter with a
government officer involving an abuse of official power that allegedly
violates some Constitutional guarantee. 70 Plaintiffs in Equal Protection
and many Fourth Amendment cases tend to be minorities. 71 There
generally is a resource, power, and information imbalance between the
government and the plaintiffs. 72 Thus, there are systemic benefits to
devising some civil rules in a manner akin to criminal rules, accounting
for those pre-identified parties, pre-determined roles, and power
imbalances, and providing procedures that will benefit a particular side
73
to the litigation.

69 See id. at 2225 ("[l]n civil rights cases, by statutory or constitutional definitions, the
defendants can only be those acting 'under color of state law'-i.e., governmental entities or
those who work for state and local governments."); Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg,
Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the
Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 719, 749 (1988) ("[Bly definition, the
government or its officials are the defendants in constitutional tort cases.").
70 See Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 38, at 825 ("The implicit purpose of § 1983 is the
restraint of governmental conduct violative of any federal right ... "); Wells, supra note 5, at 618
(arguing that § 1983 cases are "mainly concerned with redressing abuses of power by
government officers"); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 1, at 675 (arguing that the
nature of the injury is affected in constitutional cases by the fact that government actors are
involved).
71 See Resnik, Domain, supra note 43, at 2225.
72 See Thomas D. Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662-63 [hereinafter Rowe, Attorney Fee] (describing problems of one side
in particular class of litigation regularly having the advantage of superior resources); Schwab &
Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 749 ("[A] private person suing the government is in a weaker
position that [sic] a private person suing another private person.").
73 See Resnik, Domain, supra note 43, at 2223. In fact, Congress has sought to ease some of
the resource imbalances in § 1983 through the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b), a one-way fee shifting statute under which civil rights plaintiffs ordinarily
recover fees when they prevail on their claims, although they generally will not be responsible for
the defendants' fees if they do not prevail. See Rowe, Attorney Fee, supra note 72, at 678;
Tobias, Public Law Litigation, supra note 47, at 312; see also Christianburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17, 421 (1978) (stating that a plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an
attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust," while defendants
will recover only "upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith"). The fee-shifting scheme
explicitly sought to remedy the resource, power, and experience imbalance between the one-shot
private plaintiff and the repeat-player government entity or officer defendants. See Resnik,
Failing Faith, supra note 45, at 518-20 (arguing that one-way fee shifting is a way, but not the
only way, to subsidize poor litigants); Rowe, Attorney Fee, supra note 72, at 664 ("[W]hen a
legislature perceives a regular imbalance, it can seek to match adversaries more evenly by
adopting some form of fee shifting to prevent disproportionate advantage in access to and use of
the legal process."); Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 39, at 806 (arguing that § 1988 recognized
resource discrepancies between civil rights plaintiffs and those parties they normally oppose); see
also Resnik, FailingFaith, supra note 45, at 517 ("Adversarialism is a plausible mechanism for
generating information leading to acceptable outcomes and for validating individual dignity only
when the adversaries are roughly comparable-when each side has similar resources.").
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Structure and Application of Rule 15(c)(3)

Mrs. Hall timely filed her original Complaint, naming as
defendants Baker County and Sheriffs Deputies John Doe 1-3, two
days before the period ran. 74 Her problems arise in attempting to amend
the Complaint, renaming Deputies John Doe 1-3 as Deputy Screws,
Deputy Kelley, and Police Officer Jones; the limitations period expired
before she discovered their names and before she moved for leave to
amend. The three officers oppose the motion for leave, arguing that
justice does not require that leave be granted because the Amended
Complaint will be barred by the applicable limitations period, making
the Amended Complaint futile.

75

Rule 15(c) and relation back potentially fill this void.76 Relation
back is a legal fiction, pursuant to which claims against newly named
(or renamed) parties in an amended pleading will, under certain
77
conditions, be deemed filed as part of the initial, timely pleading;
claims against the newly named defendants will be treated as if they had
been brought within the limitations period. Rule 15(c)(3) applies
whenever the amended pleading "changes the party or the naming of the
party against whom a claim is asserted." 78 The rule establishes four
elements that must be met in order for an amended pleading to relate
back. 79 First, the claims asserted in the Amended Complaint must arise
74 See discussion supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
75 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (providing that, after a responsive pleading has been served, "a
party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court... and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires."); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (stating that one ground
for denial of leave to amend under Rule 15(a) is futility of amendment).
76 See Lewis, supra note 16, at 1511 ("Relation back rules breathe new life into lawsuits in
which the person or entity the plaintiff intends to sue, the 'intended defendant,' has not received
personal or precise notice of an action's commencement until after the last day of an applicable
period of limitations.").
77 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 674 (describing "legal fiction" of relation back); Rice,
supra note 16, at 898 ("Relation back is a fiction that saves an otherwise later amendment to a
pleading.").
78 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3); see also Brussack, supra note 16, at 675-76 (discussing the
argument that an amendment changing the name of a defendant from the government entity or
agency to an individual officer at the head of that entity or agency merely corrects, rather than
changes, the name of the party, making it unnecessary to satisfy the remainder of the relation
back requirements; ultimately rejecting that view in light of the history of Rule 15(c)(3)). The
"naming of the party" language was added in 1991, to make clear that changing the defendant
from the government to an officer does trigger Rule 15(c)(3) and such amendment must satisfy
the rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's notes to 1991 Amendment; see also
Lewis, supra note 16, at 1515 (describing difficulties plaguing courts prior to 1991 in determining
which amendments truly change parties defendant).
79 In the alternative, relation back is permitted whenever "relation back is permitted by the
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from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the
original Complaint. 80
Second, a timing provision demands that the defendant to be added
receive certain notice regarding the lawsuit and his role in it within 120
days of the filing of the lawsuit. 81 A federal-question action such as §
1983 is commenced by filing the Complaint with the district court,
which halts the running of the limitations clock. 82 The plaintiff then has
120 days to serve the Complaint and summons on the defendants. 83 In
essence, the period in which a named defendant must formally be
notified that he is a party to the action is the statutory limitations period
plus 120 days. 84 Similarly, assuming a lawsuit filed on the last day
law that provided the statute of limitations applicable to the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1).
Several states, including Alabama, Mississippi, and New Jersey, specifically and explicitly permit
John Doe pleading and relation back of Doc substitutions, even without notice to the to-be-added
defendant. See Rice, supra note 16, at 941-42 & nn.218-19. Federal courts hearing § 1983
actions in those states permit the change of names and relation back pursuant to the state relation
back rule incorporated through 15(c)(1). See id. at 942. Absent such express state allowance of
relation back of Doe pleading, the federal court must look elsewhere for guidance on whether
relation back is proper.
In any event, this use of Rule 15(c)(1) arguably is inappropriate in § 1983 actions. Section
1983 "borrows" the state limitations period in order to fill interstices in federal law; in doing so, it
incorporates that state provision into federal law and converts it into a federal limitations period.
Cf MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 103 (2d ed. 1990) (suggesting that state law is "federalized" through its incorporation-byreference into federal law). For example, the incorporated limitations period is treated as federal,
rather than state, for determining whether the filing of a Complaint (which commences an action
in federal court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 3) tolls the clock and allows for service of process even after
the period has expired. Compare West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987) ("[W]hen the
underlying cause of action is based on federal law and the absence of an express federal statute of
limitations makes it necessary to borrow a limitations period from another statute, the action is
not barred if it has been 'commenced' in compliance with Rule 3 within the borrowed period."),
with Walker v. Arnco Steel Co., 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980) (stating that Rule 3 was not intended
to toll a state statute of limitations in diversity actions), See also West, 481 U.S. at 39 n.4
(reaffirming Walker rule that, in diversity actions, state law determines whether service must be
commenced within the limitations period). The two-year limitations period for § 1983, having
been borrowed from state law, now is "provided by" federal law, not state law, rendering Rule
15(c)(1) inapplicable.
80 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3) (incorporating Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) (requiring that the
"claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading")); see also Rice, supra
note 16, at 928.
81 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3) ("within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the
summons and complaint"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (providing plaintiff with 120 days after the filing
of the complaint to affect service); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's notes to
1991 Amendments ("An intended defendant who is notified of an action within the period
allowed by Rule 4(m) for service of a summons and complaint may not under the revised rule
defeat the action on account of a defect in the pleading with respect to the defendant's name,
provided that the requirements of clauses (A) and (B) have been met.").
82 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 3; West, 481 U.S. at 39.
83 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
84 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 682-83 ("[T]he underlying premise [is] that the statutory
period for filing the complaint plus the period permitted for service on the defendant, when added
together, provide the defendant with sufficiently timely notice to accomplish the aims of
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before the statute of limitations expires, the period in which an intended
to-be-named defendant must have notice of the action for relation-back
purposes is the day of filing plus 120 days. 85 This does not mean that
the Amended Complaint necessarily must be filed within those 120
days, only that the defendant must receive notice within that period.
Rule 15(c)(3) then requires that the target defendant receive two
types of notice: 1) notice of the lawsuit, that a civil action is pending,
and 2) notice of his role in that lawsuit, that he is an intended target of
the action who could or would be made a party. As to the first, the
defendant must have received "such notice of the institution of the
action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on
the merits. ' 86 This means that the target defendant must learn or be
made aware that a lawsuit was filed seeking some legal relief for claims
arising out of some particular conduct, transaction, or occurrence, such
that he knows to gather and protect the evidence he will need for his
87
defense.
This notice need not be formal. 88 Notice often is imputed by virtue
limitations doctrine."); Cooper, supra note 20, at 5 (explaining that, where the plaintiff files on
Day 730 of a two-year limitations period, a defendant may not receive notice until Day 850).
85 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 683; Cooper, supra note 20, at 5. The use of the 120-day
period as the benchmark for notice was established in the 1991 amendment to Rule 15(c),
expressly to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Schiavone v. Fortune,477 U.S. 21 (1986).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's note to 1991 Amendment ("This paragraph has
been revised to change the result in Schiavone v. Fortune, supra, with respect to the problem of a
misnamed defendant.").
In Schiavone, the Court read the former language requiring notice "within the period
provided by law for commencing the action" to require notice prior to the expiration of the statute
of limitations. See Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 31; Brussack, supra note 16, at 681; Cooper, supra
note 20, at 2; Rice, supra note 16, at 929 & n.169. In other words, only if the to-be-added
defendant had notice of the action prior to the expiration of the limitations period would relation
back be possible. The decision in Schiavone was the target of strong scholarly criticism. See
Bauer, supra note 42, at 732 ("Other than references to the 'plain meaning' of the Rule and
quotations of ambiguous language in the Advisory Committee's Notes, there is nothing else to
explain or support the Court's result."); Brussack, supranote 16, at 683 (arguing that the decision
gives an advantage to misnamed defendants over correctly named defendants, who often need not
receive notice of the lawsuit until after the expiration of the limitations period, but within the
period for service); Cooper, supra note 20, at 2 ("The difficulty with the conclusion is that it
requires notice to the 'new' defendant at a time earlier than would be required if the new
defendant had been properly identified in the initial complaint."). It generally was agreed that the
result was inconsistent with liberal pleading practices under the Federal Rules, prompting
amendment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's notes to 1991 Amendment; Rice,
supra note 16, at 929-30 & n. 171.
86 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(A).
87 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 3 ("The notice that obviates prejudice in defending responds
to the purpose to protect the opportunity to gather evidence and to stimulate the gathering.");
Rice, supra note 16, at 928 ("If the new defendant did not have timely notice of the lawsuit, the
plaintiff cannot add him....").
88 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's note to 1966 Amendment ("[T]he notice
need not be formal."); Lewis, supra note 16, at 1557-58 n.246 ("Adequate notice may instead
reach the intended defendant wholly outside the channels of a lawsuit or, after an action
commences, through documents or events other than service of process."); Rice, supra note 16, at
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of the original defendants and the to-be-added defendants sharing
counsel or sharing some overlap of interests. 89 The court also will look
to evidence that the to-be-added defendant actually learned and knew of
the lawsuit. For example, attorneys and higher government officials
likely spoke with the officer who committed the alleged violation, in
order to learn from him what happened and why, who else might have
been present, and other information necessary for the government entity
to prepare its own defense. Government attorneys likely will show each
officer a copy of the Complaint, so he could see what was alleged and
help the government prepare a response. The officer might have heard
from other rank-and-file officers that a lawsuit had been filed and that
there might be some issues involving him. He might have learned about
the lawsuit in the media. 90 In addition, the plaintiffs motion to amend,
which often includes a copy of the proposed Amended Complaint as an
attachment, may provide that notice when served on the officers. 9'
Second, the target defendant must or should know that "but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would
92
have been brought against" the target defendant in the first instance.
The to-be-added party must have notice that he is a target of the lawsuit,
that he allegedly played some role in the conduct or occurrence that
injured the plaintiff, and that he is or could be liable for that injury. In
other words, the officer defendant must know that the plaintiff meant to
sue him.
The mistake requirement has become the crux of Rule 15(c)(3).
That provision was added in 1966 to undo the restrictive application of
relation back in actions brought by private individuals against the
federal government. 93 The cases that caught the Rules Advisory
904 ("[T]hat notice need not be formal service.").
89 See Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 28 (describing "identity-of-interest" means of imputing notice);
Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 2001); Jacobsen v.
Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding identity of interest by virtue of shared
counsel).
90 Courts have held that a plaintiff is or should be on inquiry notice of a potential § 1983

claim by virtue of newspaper reports highlighting government misconduct and suggesting that a
civil claim may lie. See Jenny Rivera, Extra! Extra! Read All About It. What a Plaintiff"Knows

or Should Know" Based on Officials' Statements and Media Coverage of Police Misconduct For
Notice ofa § 1983 Municipal Liability Claim, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 505, 552-53 (2000). If

media reports can provide a plaintiff with notice that he might have a meritorious cause of action,
such reports similarly should provide a potential defendant with notice of the lawsuit. This is

particularly true in high-profile television cases, in which counsel and plaintiff often will hold
press conferences simply to announce that they have filed a lawsuit.

91 See Rice, supra note 16, at 930 n.172 ("The motion itself serves as notice of the lawsuit
and unequivocally puts the new defendant on notice that he is an intended defendant.").

92 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(B).
93 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's note to 1966 Amendment ("The problem has
arisen most acutely in certain actions by private parties against officers or agencies of the United
States."); see also Brussack, supra note 16, at 674-75 ("[lI]n cases involving government
defendants, lower federal courts had applied the dichotomy in a way that seemed to exalt form
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Committee's attention involved social security benefits claimants whose
appeals to the district court named as defendant the United States or the
executive agency or the former Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare rather than the current Secretary. 94 Relation back was denied
when the claimant moved to amend and change the name after the
statutory 60-day appeal period had expired, even though the
government agency and officials acting on behalf of the agency
unquestionably knew the actions had been filed. 95 The rule as amended
permitted a claimant to change the named defendant to the current
Secretary in the event of a "misnomer or misdescription" as to the
proper defendant, even after the limitations period had run. 96

The

Committee emphasized that the government had been put on notice of
the social security claims within the stated period by means of initial
97
service on some government officer.
The purpose and function of relation back is intertwined with the
purpose and function of statutes of limitations. 98 Limitations periods
protect a range of interests inuring primarily to potential defendants. 99
A defendant has an interest in not being put to the burden of defending
over the aims of the limitations doctrine."); Lewis, supra note 16, at 1514 ("[A] number of
decisions involving federal government defendants applied the rule quite restrictively."); Rice,
supra note 16, at 901 (stating that the concern came from cases where plaintiffs mistakenly
named the wrong government defendant).
94 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 671; Lewis, supra note 16, at 1516; see also 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) (2003) (granting federal court jurisdiction to hear appeals from denial of social security
benefits, where Secretary is named as defendant, where applicant files appeal within 60 days).
95 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's note to 1966 Amendment; Brussack, supra
note 16, at 671-72; Lewis, supra note 16, at 1516-17.
96 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's notes to 1966 Amendment ("[T]o deny
relation back is to defeat unjustly the claimant's opportunity to prove his case."); see also
Brussack, supra note 16, at 672 (arguing that the rule was amended to ensure that the statute of
limitations would not be a problem in such cases); Lewis, supra note 16, at 1518 (arguing that the
amendment "appears designed to expand the circumstances in which relation back would be
allowed is indicated by the Committee's critical references to the restrictive governmentdefendant decisions"). To further this goal in actions against the federal government and federal
officers, an additional paragraph in the rule provides that service is proper on the United States
Attorney, his designee, the Attorney General of the United States, and the agency or officer who
would have been a proper defendant if named. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15
Advisory Committee's notes to 1966 Amendment.
97 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's notes to 1966 Amendment ("[T]he
government was put on notice within the stated period.").
98 See Lewis, supra note 16, at 1511 (arguing that, without relation back, amendments would
violate the statute of limitations and its underlying policies); Rice, supra note 16, at 903 (arguing
that the rules for relation back protect the substantive aims of statutes of limitations); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's note to 1966 Amendment ("Relation back is intimately
connected with the policy of the statute of limitations.").
99 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 682 ("Statutes of limitations exist primarily to protect
potential defendants."); Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes
of Limitations, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 483 (1997) (arguing that "one of the purposes of a limitation
system is to avoid making it unreasonably difficult for defendants to answer the claims against
them"); id. at 484 (arguing that limitations periods rest on the premise that delay generally works
to the disadvantage of the defendant rather than the plaintiff).
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against stale claims in lawsuits occurring so far after the event that
witnesses may have become unavailable, memories may have faded,
and evidence may have been lost. 0 0 A defendant has an interest in
repose, in the opportunity to rest easy, secure that at some point he no
longer will be called to answer for past misdeeds.' 0' Statutes of
limitations depend, above all, on the defendant receiving notice within a
specified period of time that a civil action has been commenced and that
he, and his past conduct, are targets of that civil action.1 02 The target
defendant knows that he should gather and preserve evidence and
prepare a possible defense and he knows that he is not entitled to
repose, but will be called to answer for his conduct.
The 1966 amendments to Rule 15(c)(3) explicitly brought relation
back into line with limitations by making notice to the target defendant
the theoretical touchstone of both. 03 Relation back is proper where the
100 See Bauer, supra note 42, at 731 ("[T]he courts.., are entitled as well to take steps to
lessen the likelihood of trials where memories of witnesses grow dim and where evidence is
unreliable or unavailable."); Brussack, supra note 16, at 682 ("Such statutes help ensure against
litigation that occurs so long after the event that witnesses and evidence may be unavailable or
lost, jeopardizing a defendant's ability to defeat baseless allegations."); Lewis, supra note 16, at
1511 ("Foremost is protecting a defendant from claims brought after 'memories have faded,
witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost."'); Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note
99, at 471 (arguing that concerns for the deterioration of evidence serve several distinct, but
overlapping, purposes, including ensuring accuracy of fact-finding, reducing litigation costs, and
preserving the integrity of the judicial system); id. at 472 (arguing that limitations periods rest on
the premise that evidence deteriorates over time and that the effects of such deterioration on the
accuracy of fact-finding process can be avoided by barring late claims); Rice, supra note 16, at
904 (emphasizing the need to "ensure that a defendant can protect against lost or stale evidence
and not suffer prejudice at trial due to the plaintiff's delay"); see also Chase Sec. Corp. v.
Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) (emphasizing that statutes of limitations "spare the courts
from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have
faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost").
10 See Bauer, supra note 42, at 731 ("At some point, defendants are entitled to repose,
knowing that the threat of litigation no longer hangs over their heads .... "); Brussack, supra note
16, at 682 ("[Tlhe statutes allow potential defendants to continue their lives or businesses by
providing a date after which an incident can be relegated to the past."); Lewis, supra note 16, at
1511 (arguing that statutes of limitations alleviate a potential defendant's economic or
psychological insecurity); Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 99, at 460 (arguing that repose includes
four distinct, but overlapping, concepts, including peace of mind and reduction of uncertainty
about the future); Rice, supra note 16, at 905 ("He is entitled to repose.").
102 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 682. ("[N]otice to a defendant within a certain time is the
universally recognized mechanism for securing the aims of limitations doctrine .. "); Cooper,
supra note 20, at 3 ("The notice that obviates prejudice in defending responds to the purpose to
protect the opportunity to gather evidence and to stimulate the gathering."); Ochoa & Wistrich,
supra note 99, at 483 (arguing that statutes of limitations serve their purpose by "requiring timely
notice to potential defendants").
103 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's note to 1966 Amendment (emphasizing that
relation back should be proper in cases where the government was put on notice of the claim
within the required period); see also Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 99, at 487 (arguing that
relation back of amendments "depend[s] in part upon a showing that the plaintiff has in some
effective manner placed the defendant on notice of the claim, providing the defendant with a fair
opportunity to protect his or her interests by collecting relevant evidence shortly after the events
at issue").
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statute of limitations would not be offended if the plaintiff is permitted
to bring the newly named defendant into the case, precisely because that
10 4
defendant was put on notice to preserve evidence and not to rest easy.
This emphasis on notice ensures that a newly named defendant will not
be dragged into a case after the expiration of the limitations period
unless he received notice of the action, its subject matter, and his
potential role in it, as if he had been named in the timely filed original
Complaint. 105 In light of this intimate theoretical connection between
limitations and relation back, the focus of relation back analysis should

be not on mistake, but on notice.
B.

Unique Problem ofJohn Doe Defendants

A plaintiff often does not know the proper name or identity of the
target defendant at the time the action is commenced. Further, she often

is unable to learn that identity until after she files the action and obtains
the critical information through formal discovery, by which time the
limitations period has run. 10 6 This is Mrs. Hall's problem: she does not
know the identities of the three officers who arrested and assaulted her
husband and needs some formal investigative process to discover them.
Unfortunately, a plaintiff usually cannot get judicial help in identifying
the officers and cannot engage in formal, court-supervised discovery
until she files the lawsuit. 10 7 But she cannot file the lawsuit (and initiate
the discovery process) unless she can identify some potentially liable
08
proper defendant. 1

Pleading "Unknown" or John Doe defendants perhaps provides a
way around the dilemma. 10 9 There are two elements to effective John
Doe pleading. First, the Complaint should sketch Doe, through some
detailed, specific descriptions of the individuals involved and of their
104 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 3 ("Knowing that the new party would have been sued if
only the plaintiff had known enough both helps to stimulate the evidence gathering and also
defeats the sense of repose that arises with the end of a limitations period."); Lewis, supra note
16, at 1512 (arguing that relation back reflects a compromise between the conflicting policies of
statutes of limitations and modem circumstances that justify relaxation of those strictures).
105 See Bauer, supra note 42, at 731 (arguing that one purpose of Rule 15(c) "is to ensure that
an action should proceed if the intended defendant receives timely notice of the nature and
pendency of the action against it"); Rice, supra note 16, at 904 (arguing that the new defendant
not only should know of the lawsuit, but also should appreciate that he is an intended defendant in
the action).
106 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 691; Cooper, supra note 20, at 4 ("The plaintiff very well
may have faced insuperable difficulties in learning the identities of the arresting officers.").
107 See Rice, supra note 16, at 896 n.39.
108 See id. at 896 ("[H]e cannot file the suit without naming at least one defendant."); id at
896-97 (arguing that procedural and ethical rules prohibit a plaintiff from suing any random
officer, but require some basis for naming or describing a particular person as a defendant).
109 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 691; Rice, supranote 16, at 897.
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wrongful conduct." 0 The Doe allegations should enable someone
familiar with the events at issue, especially the intended defendant
himself, to recognize John Doe."'l This may require a description of the
allegedly wrongful conduct; the date, time, and place of the occurrence;
12
and Doe's position, actions, and role in the wrongful conduct.
Particularized Doe allegations ensure the notice required for relation
back. 113
Second, the plaintiff must find some known, identifiable,
potentially liable adverse party to name as a defendant in the action
along with Doe; the plaintiff then can serve the Complaint on that
known party and utilize party discovery to identify the more important
defendants." 4 In § 1983 actions, this known party most commonly will
be the government entity for which the individual officer acts.'"1 5 It also
could be a known individual, such as a supervisor or a fellow officer. A
'
plaintiff perhaps could sue only John Doe or "Unknown Officers, 16
but this raises the genuine question of how to serve a Complaint that
names no identifiable person or entity as defendant.'7
The Federal Rules do not mention John Doe or unknown-defendant
pleading and provide no guidance as to how to handle relation back in
such cases. 1 8 This perhaps is a product of the paradigm that guided the
drafters of the original rules: a private tort or contract action for

I1 See Rice, supra note 16, at 947 (emphasizing the importance of particularized Doe
allegations that distinguish the unknown defendant in some way).
Il I See id.at 948 ("The key is to put the intended defendant on notice, if he were to read the
complaint, that he is John Doe.").
112 See id.
at 948-49; cf Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 201 (3d Cir.
2001) (holding that, where the Doe defendants were identified as "Corrections Officers," a prison
psychologist would not receive notice that he is an intended target of the action).
113 See Rice, supra note 16, at 947 ("[T]he federal court in most cases must insist that the
defendant have had timely notice that he is the intended defendant. Particularized, not generic,
Doe allegations will help serve this aim.").
114 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 5 ("[T]here will be eases where the defendant has a claim
against an identifiable adversary strong enough to meet the Rule 11 test, and can proceed to
attempt to use discovery to identify the more important defendants.").
I15See, e.g., Singletary, 266 F.3d at 189 (naming the Department of Corrections, the prison,
the former warden, and "Unknown Corrections Officers"); Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1101
(1 th Cir. 1999) (naming Sheriff, Sheriff's Department, and "Seven Unknown Deputy Sheriffs");
Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466, 467 (2d Cir. 1996) (naming township, police
department, and "Police Officers").
116 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971); King v. One Unknown Federal Correctional Officer, 201 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2000).
117Compare Cooper, supra note 20, at 5 ("The strategy of simply suing a pseudonymous
defendant as a basis for invoking discovery to find a real defendant is not permitted in most
federal courts."), with Rice, supra note 16, at 897 (suggesting that simply naming a John Doe
defendant permits a plaintiff to begin his lawsuit and initiate discovery); see discussion infra
notes 259-81 and accompanying text.
118 See Rice, supra note 16, at 887 ("Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the
Judiciary Code give courts guidance on the proper procedure for the use of Doe parties ....The
Rules simply do not contemplate the case where a plaintiff does not know the true identity of the
defendant.").
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damages between one plaintiff and one defendant, who know one
another's identity (likely because of a pre-existing business
relationship) and the substance of the events giving rise to the civil
action.1 19 Absent a true John Doe rule, such pleading practices must
squeeze into the existing rules framework.
Mrs. Hall's is, in many respects, the classic Doe Complaint: she
named Baker County (a known, identifiable, potentially liable party)

and Sheriffs Deputies John Doe 1-3 in the original timely pleading,
used the County as a discovery source to identify the Does, then sought
leave to file an Amended Complaint properly replacing Does with
Screws, Kelley, and Jones. 120 But the limitations period had expired by
this point. For this pleading practice to work, Mrs. Hall must be able to

amend, even after the statute of limitations has run, particularly where it
takes several months of discovery to obtain the necessary information
and the plaintiff uses most of the limitations period prior to
commencing the action.' 21

In Bivens,

22

the district court, facing a

Complaint that identified no defendant by name, ordered that the
Complaint be served on "those federal agents who it is indicated by the

23
records of the United States Attorney participated" in Bivens's arrest.
This is atypical; "most plaintiffs do not get this much help from the
court.' ' 124 A plaintiff must be able to relate back the Amended

Complaint naming the now-known defendants after the statute of
limitations has run.
The problem is the prevailing interpretation of the Rule 15(c)(3)(B)

requirement of a "mistake concerning the identity of the proper

119 See Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 45, at 508; see discussion supra notes 46-73 and
accompanying text.
120 See discussion supra notes 2-15 and accompanying text.
121 It could be argued that one way around the timing dilemma is for a plaintiffwho knows she
does not know the names of the proper defendants to file well before the limitations period has
expired, leaving her sufficient time to conduct discovery, learn the defendants' names, and amend
the Complaint, all before the limitations period has run. See Cooper, supra note 20, at 4; see also
discussion infra notes 177-97 and accompanying text.
122 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
123 See id. at 390 n.2; Rice, supra note 16, at 886-87, 897. The Seventh Circuit in one case
imposed similar duties on the district court, at least where the plaintiff proceeds pro se. The court
suggested that the district court take any of several steps, including ordering the named
defendants to disclose the identities of the unnamed officers, allowing the case to proceed to
discovery against high-level administrators with the expectation that this discovery will reveal the
identities of potentially responsible individual officers, or ordering service of the Doe Complaint
on all officers who were on duty during the incident in question. See Donald v. Cook County
Sheriffs Dep't, 95 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1996). But see King v. One Unknown Fed- Corr.
Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 915 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff could not rely on Donald where
plaintiff did not know the names of the proper individual officers and did not name the institution
as a defendant).
124 Rice, supra note 16, at 897; see discussion infra notes 251-81 and accompanying text.
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party. ' 125 The rule does not define mistake. The Advisory Committee
spoke of providing relation back for amendments correcting a
"misnomer or misdescription of a defendant."'1 26 But neither the text of
the rule nor the advisory notes address whether a mistake as to identity
can or should include ignorance or lack of knowledge concerning that
identity. The overwhelming judicial and scholarly consensus is that
lack of knowledge is not mistake. As Professor Rice baldly asserts, a
"Doe allegation simply is not a mistake." 127 Lower federal courts
agree,128 in light of the Advisory Committee's focus on misnomer or
misdescription. 129 A plaintiff such as Mrs. Hall thus will be precluded
in most courts from relating back the Amended Complaint naming
Screws, Kelly, and Jones.
The lone departure is a twenty-five-year-old personal injury action
from the Third Circuit, Varlack v. SWC Caribbean,Inc. 130 The original
Complaint named as defendants the corporate owner of the restaurant
and an "Unknown Employee of Orange Julius Restaurant," the
employee who had struck him. The plaintiff learned the name of that
unknown employee, Bernette Cannings, during discovery and moved to
amend the Complaint after the two-year statute of limitations had
expired. 31 In affirming the district court's decision permitting relation
125 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(B); see discussion supra note 17 and accompanying text.
126 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's notes to 1966 Amendments.
127 Rice, supra note 16, at927, 952 ("The failing of the current relation back standard in Rule
15(c)(3) in Doe cases is that the initial pleading a Doe defendant is not a 'mistake."'); see Cooper,
supra note 20, at 3 (stating that where the plaintiff knew from the beginning that he did not know
the identity of the proper defendants, this was "ignorance, not mistake"); Engrav, supra note 31,
at 1585 ("Such plaintiffs do not misunderstand either who the Doe is or the relationship between
the Doe and themselves. Instead, plaintiffs suing Doe defendants are fully aware that they lack
knowledge of the identity of the party they intend to sue, and that awareness prompts them to
include a Doe defendant.").
128 See, e.g., King, 201 F.3d at 914 (holding that the plaintiff did not satisfy the mistake
requirement for relation back when he had a "simple lack of knowledge of the identity of the
proper party"); Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff's
"lack of knowledge regarding the identities of the deputy sheriffs was not a 'mistake concerning
the identity of the proper party."'); Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 321-22 (5th Cir. 1998)
("[T]he proposed amendment as to the deputies was not necessitated by the 'mistake' or
'misidentification' at which Rule 15(c)(3) is aimed."); Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th
Cir. 1996) (holding that amendment substituting named defendants for unknown police officers
did not satisfy requirement of mistaken identity); Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1257 (7th
Cir. 1993) (holding that because plaintiffs failure to name the officer defendants "was due to a
lack of knowledge as to their identity, and not a mistake in their names, Worthington was
prevented from availing himself of the relation back doctrine of Rule 15(c)").
129 See Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Advisory Committee's notes and holding that commentary implies that relation back is proper
only if"the change isthe result of an error").
130 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1977). The plaintiff
alleged that he was injured when an employee
at a restaurant hit him with a two-by-four, dazing him and causing him to stumble into an alley
and fall through a glass window, injuring his right arm, which had to be amputated. See id.at
173-74.
131See id.at 174.
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back, the court emphasized Cannings' testimony that he knew there was
a suit against an unknown employee, that he knew the phrase "unknown
employee" referred to him, and that he knew that if his name had been
in the caption he would have been one of the persons sued.132 This was
sufficient to satisfy Rule 15(c)(3).
Importantly, Varlack did not focus on the meaning of the mistake
clause.133 Instead, the court conflated notice and mistake, emphasized
notice, and held essentially that the fact that the target defendant knew
of the lawsuit and knew that he was the unknown employee described
satisfied both elements of Rule 15(c)(3). Textual fidelity to one side,
the result in Varlack allowing relation back strikes many commentators
1 34
as proper.
But the Third Circuit appears to be backing away from Varlack,
perhaps realizing that "sticky issues" call its earlier approach into
doubt. 135 In Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, the
plaintiff prisoner brought a § 1983 action against, inter alia, "Unknown
Corrections Officers," then sought to amend the Complaint to replace
one Unknown Corrections Officer with the prison psychologist, the one
person against whom the plaintiff had a potentially viable claim.136 The
Third Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to permit relation back,
based entirely on the absence of any notice satisfying Rule
15(c)(3)(A). 137 The court avoided resolution of the meaning of the
word mistake, finding it unnecessary in light of the lack of notice.1 38
132 See id. at 175.

133 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 692 (stating that the Third Circuit reached its conclusion
"without looking too closely at the language" of the mistake clause); see also Singletary v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 201 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that every other court of
appeals had come out contrary to Varlack, based on the "linguistic argument that a lack of
knowledge of a defendant's identity is not a mistake concerning that identity").
134 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 692 (arguing that the approach in Varlack "takes account of
the difficulties that can attend the discovery of a defendant's name, and does no offense to the
policies underlying statutes of limitations"); Cooper, supra note 20, at 4 (questioning why the
plaintiff should be left out in the cold in the Doe scenario); Rice, supra note 16, at 939 (arguing
that focusing on the adequacy of the Doe allegations is the best possible approach under the
current rule, capturing the intent of the mistake clause without redefining it).
135 See Singletary, 266 F.3d at 190, 201 ("[B]ecause the plaintiff simply did not know of [the
target defendant's] identity, it is an open question whether failure to include him originally as a
defendant was a 'mistake' under Rule 15(c)(3)(B).").
136 See id. at 189.

137 The court emphasized several points. First, the psychologist did not share an identity of
interest with the prison sufficient to impute notice, given that the psychologist was a nonmanagement, staff-level employee with no administrative or supervisory duties and that the
psychologist did not have continuing close contact with the plaintiff that might provide notice of
the lawsuit. See Singletary, 266 F.3d at 199, 201 (emphasizing that the initial complaint had
named Unknown Corrections Officers, a description that would not necessarily provide a prison
psychologist notice that he was a potential target of the action). Second, although counsel for the
prison and warden also represented the psychologist, that representation did not commence until
after the 120-day notice period had expired. See id. at 197.
138 See id at 201
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Instead, Chief Judge Becker argued that fairness demands that relation
back be allowed in John Doe cases where notice requirements have
been satisfied; 39 he called on the Rules Advisory Committee to amend
Rule 15(c)(3) to allow relation back in cases in which the plaintiff did
1 40
not know the defendant's identity at the outset.
The other way courts have gotten around the mistake element has
been creative interpretation of the type of mistake at issue. Consider the
Second Circuit decision in Soto v. Brooklyn CorrectionalFacility.14 1 A
prisoner, proceeding pro se, named the prison as the sole defendant in a
§ 1983 action; the prison then successfully moved to dismiss the
Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to allege the
elements of entity liability. 42 The prisoner did not know, and therefore
could not sue, the individual officers who engaged in the alleged
unconstitutional conduct. 143 In holding that Soto should be given the
opportunity to file an Amended Complaint and have it relate back, the
court held that mistake under Rule 15(c)(3)(B) includes mistakes of law
at the pleading stage, mistakes as to who may be legally liable for
constitutional violations and who the proper defendant in a § 1983
action should be. In the Second Circuit's view, Soto named the prison
instead of the individual guards because he did not understand the
technicalities of § 1983 pleading and liability and therefore
misunderstood whom to sue. 144 On the other hand, any individual
officers at the prison who became aware of the lawsuit arising out of the
attack on the plaintiff knew or should have known that they potentially
were subject to liability for the constitutional tort alleged.' 45
The Second Circuit's approach, while perhaps achieving justice in
the particular case by allowing Mr. Soto to amend his pleadings and
proceed against the officers, is too narrow to function as a general rule.
It treats pro se plaintiffs differently from counseled plaintiffs; a court
would and should be far less solicitous of an attorney who does not
understand the law of § 1983 or who does not know the limited
circumstances under which the government entity may be sued and held
139 See id. at 201 n.5 (finding the conclusions of other courts of appeals "highly problematic");
id (arguing that fairness requires that the plaintiff be able to amend in the Doe situation, where
the newly named parties knew about the lawsuit, knew they were the ones targeted, and withheld
information about their identities).
140 See id. (noting that all the commentators to address the issue have called for amendment to
the rule); see discussion infra notes 221-36 and accompanying text.
141 80 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1996).
142 See id. at 35; see discussion infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
143 See id.

144 See id. at 37 ("[Blut for his mistake as to the technicalities of constitutional tort law, he
would have named the officers in the original complaint within the three-year limitations period,
or at least named the superintendent of the facility and obtained the names of the responsible
officers through discovery.").
145 See id. at 36.
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liable. 146 But a counseled plaintiff is just as likely to lack knowledge of
an intended defendant's identity as a pro se plaintiff.
Further, the court's suggestion that a non-mistaken plaintiff would
have sued the prison superintendent and obtained the names through
discovery

47

is not helpful because

the superintendent or other

supervisory officer is no more vicariously liable for the individual acts
of rank-and-file officers than is the government entity. 148 Just as the
prison was able to get itself dismissed prior to discovery because the
Complaint failed to allege the elements of entity liability, so could the

superintendent get himself dismissed because the Complaint fails to
allege the type of deliberate indifference necessary to state a claim for
supervisory liability. 4 9 The problem remains that the plaintiff does not
know the individual actors who committed the constitutional violation.

The mistake that Soto and other § 1983 plaintiffs make is not one of
law, but one of fact-the fact of the identity of the proper target
defendant.
C.

Special Circumstancesof§ 1983

John Doe or Unknown Officer pleading frequently is utilized in
146 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(2) (providing that counseled party must certify that the "legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law").
147 See Soto, 80 F.3d at 37 (stating that, absent a mistake of law, Soto at least would have
named the prison superintendent).
148 See Kinports, supra note 36, at 153 (arguing that lower courts have interpreted Supreme
Court precedent as rejecting respondeat superior liability on supervisors); see also Harley v.
Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Supervisory liability [under § 1983] occurs either
when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is
a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional
deprivation. The causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts
the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to
do so. The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising
official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated
occurrences."); Colon v. Couglin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Wright v. Smith, 21
F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)):
The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that:
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the
defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to
remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which
unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or
custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who
committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to
the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional
acts were occurring.
Id. See discussion infra note 164 and accompanying text.
149 See Kinports, supra note 36, at 169 (describing the factors that establish supervisory
liability under § 1983, particularly the supervisor's knowledge and lack of responsiveness to past
misconduct); see discussion infra note 164 and accompanying text.
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civil rights actions under § 1983 and its federal Bivens counterpart. 5 0
There are several explanations for the commonality of Doe pleading in
these cases.
1.

Conduct Giving Rise to § 1983 Claims

The conduct and circumstances giving rise to § 1983 claims often
do not allow the plaintiff and defendant to exchange information
regarding their respective identities. There often is no pre-existing
relationship between a citizen and a government official. Instead, a
claim arises from a brief, one-time-only encounter between an
individual government officer and a citizen, actors who come to the
encounter from unequal positions of power.' 5 ' It may involve a violent
or extremely antagonistic, quickly occurring event. 152 The plaintiff may
not be the person who actually suffered the constitutional harm, where

150 See Rice, supra note 16, at 895 ("Civil rights cases against unknown law enforcement
officers, the most frequent use of the Doe defendant in federal courts, best illustrates this
reality."); id. at 886-87 (stating that Bivens was one of the first and most obvious uses of an
unknown defendant); see also Cooper, supra note 20, at 3 (stating that civil rights actions involve
thc "not uncommon problem" of an unknown defendant).
A Westlaw search revealed, since 1992, seventy-seven cases in which a federal court of
appeals or district court has issued an opinion on relating back an amended complaint against a
later-identified John Doe defendant; sixty-eight of those were § 1983 or Bivens actions.
A second class of cases involving John Doe defendants is defamation suits brought by
corporations against anonymous Internet speakers. The plaintiff must "sue the person who
originated the defamatory communication," the speaker himself, even though that person is
unknown. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 872 (2000). Federal law gives Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
the intermediary which republished the defamation and which (like the government in a § 1983
action) is a more obviously known or identifiable defendant, complete immunity from liability for
third-party defamations. See id at 871-72; see also discussion infra notes 304-05 and
accompanying text.
151 See Nahmod, Discourse, supra note 38, at 1747 ("[C]ourts tend to treat § 1983 plaintiffs
and defendants as anonymous strangers who have no prior relationship with one another-cven
though the defendant is a... government employee."); Wells, supra note 5, at 650 (arguing that
the primary value served in civil rights actions is "stopping egregious misconduct amounting to a
severe misuse of power on the part of a government official").
152 See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836-37 (1998) (arising from
plaintiff's decedent's death in high-speed automobile chase with police); Bd. of County Comm'rs
of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400-01 (1997) (arising from police officer forcibly
yanking plaintiff from her car via "arm bar" technique and spinning her to the ground); Bivcns v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) (arising
from federal officers entering plaintiff's apartment, arresting him, and threatening to arrest entire
family); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961) (arising from thirteen Chicago police officers
breaking into the plaintiffs home, rousting him and his family members from bed, making them
stand naked in the living room, and ransacking every room in the house); see also Singletary v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 201 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (arguing that civil rights
plaintiffs are disadvantaged where they were unable to see the name tags on offending state actors
during a hostile encounter).
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the violation in fact caused the victim's death. 153 The identities of the
offending officers are uniquely in the hands of the potential defendants,
their law enforcement compatriots, and the governmental entity, none of
which may be willing to come forward. 54 Most importantly, § 1983
actions, by definition, involve abuses of official government power,
55
resulting in different, arguably greater, injury.'
2.

Section 1983 Liability Regime

The more important factor making Doe pleading necessary under §
1983 is its uniquely complicated (one might say Byzantine 56) liability
scheme. Municipalities and local government entities are not subject to
damages on vicarious or respondeat superior liability based solely on
the existence of an employment relationship between the government
and the individual wrongdoer.157 Instead, a local governmental entity is
153 See, e.g., Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836-37 (arising from the plaintiffs' son's death in high-speed
police automobile chase); City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 811 (1985) (plurality
opinion) (arising from plaintiff husband's shooting death at the hands of police). This, of course,
is the situation in Mrs. Hall's case. See discussion supra note I and accompanying text.
154 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 4 ("Neither the arresting officers nor their police-department
compatriots may have been willing to come forward."); cf Gilles, supra note 2, at 63-71
(describing police "code of silence" as an example of government custom, given the harsh
treatment accorded officers who break the code); see discussion supra notes 1-7 and
accompanying text.
155 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 196 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[A] deprivation of a constitutional
right is significantly different from and more serious than a violation of a state right and therefore
deserves a different remedy ....
");Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 38, at 825 ("The implicit
purpose of § 1983 is the restraint of governmental conduct violative of any federal right ....
");
Nahmod, Discourse, supra note 38, at 1747 (arguing that § 1983 actions should not be treated as
ordinary tort cases, given that the defendant is a government or government employee); Wells,
supra note 5, at 618 (arguing that § 1983 cases are "mainly concerned with redressing abuses of
power by government officers"); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, supra note 1,at 675 ("[t1n
constitutional cases, the person who is said to have wronged another is by definition someone
who has a special power to do harm because of his government position. Because the
government is implicated, the nature of the inquiry is affected."); id at 677 ("Society has more of
a stake in constitutional behavior by officials.").
156 See Brown, 520 U.S. at 431 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine of municipal
liability has "generated a body of interpretive law that is so complex that the law has become
difficult to apply," grounded in distinctions that are "obsolete and a potential source of
confusion"); Susan Bandes, Introduction: The Emperor's New Clothes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 619,
619 (1999) (describing § 1983 jurisprudence as a "highly peculiar body of law"); Beennann,
supra note 23, at 653 (describing § 1983 liability rules as a "complicated morass"); id. at 667
(stating that the Court, not Congress, is responsible for the "doctrinal mess" that is § 1983);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's FederalismDecisions,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 463 (2002) (stating that it is "exceedingly difficult to prove that local
governments are causally responsible, and thus directly liable, for wrongs committed by their
officials"); Gilles, supra note 2, at 35 ("[T]he Court's jurisprudence in this area 'manifestly needs
clarification' .... "); Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 38, at 756 (expressing hope that a coherent
whole may be recomposed of bits of civil rights jurisprudence).
157See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403 ("[A] municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely
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liable only if the plaintiff pleads and proves that some municipal policy
or custom actually caused the constitutional violation. 158 As one
commentator has argued, the "fundamental principle in the law of
municipal liability under § 1983 is that municipalities may be held
liable only for their own conduct, not for the conduct of municipal
employees.' 59 The plaintiff must show that the actor who committed
or participated in the violation was the final policymaker for that
entity; 160 that the offending actor proceeded pursuant to a formal policy,
provision, or decision officially promulgated or explicitly ratified by
that official policymaker; 16! or that the violative rank-and-file actor
proceeded pursuant to a common custom or practice of which some
final policymaker had knowledge. 162 Local government also may be
because it employs a tortfeasor."); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978) (holding that a municipality cannot be held liable under §1983 on a respondeatsuperior
theory); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 (requiring proof of a "direct causal link between the
municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights"); Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 674
("[G]overnment acts as government only when it has played the role of decisionmaker or
legislature.").
158 See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403; Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 38, at 787-88; Whitman,
Government Responsibility, supra note 6, at 254; see also Beermann, supra note 23, at 627
(stating that the local governmental entity "can be held liable only when municipal policy is the
moving force behind the violation").
159 Beermann, supra note 23, at 627.
160 See Brown, 520 U.S. at 408 (accepting stipulation of parties that Sheriff, who made hiring
decision at issue, had final authority to act on behalf of County), McMillian v. Monroe County,
520 U.S. 781, 783 (1997) ("If the sheriffs actions constitute county 'policy,' then the county is
liable for them."); City of St. Louis v. Prapromik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (setting forth
principles for defining who is a policymaker for purposes of municipal liability); see also Brown,
supra note 6, at 1513 n.57; Gilles, supra note 2, at 38 ("[A] § 1983 plaintiff may attribute to the
municipality actions of supervisory personnel whose 'acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy."'); Whitman, Government Responsibility, supra note 6, at 254-55 ("The Court had no
language for describing how an institution or a government uniquely acts, so it looked to acts,
such as passage of ordinances or regulations, or decisions by those with a very high level of
authority, that, in essence, label themselves as institutional or governmental.").
161 See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-04 ("Locating a 'policy' ensures that a municipality is held
liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative
body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.");
Praprotnik,485 U.S. at 127 ("If the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision
and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their
decision is final."); Monel!, 436 U.S. at 695 ("[Ilit is when execution of a government's policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §
1983."); see also Whitman, Government Responsibility, supra note 6, at 254 (arguing that the
Court's approach requires the plaintiffto look for the individual or individuals who could be said
to act for the government).
162 See Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 ("[A]n act performed pursuant to a 'custom' that has not been
formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability
on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law."); Monel!,
436 U.S. at 690-91 (stating that local governments may be sued for "constitutional deprivations
visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such custom has not received formal
approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels"). But see Gilles, supra note 2, at
49 (arguing that the very evils that the custom language was designed to address-the unwritten
codes of conduct that permeated local officialdom-are precisely the evils that are least
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liable for single unconstitutional acts of individual officers where there
has been some failure to train, supervise, discipline, or otherwise control
the individual actor, a difficult inquiry that demands some deliberate or
intentional misconduct on the part of a policymaker acting on behalf of
the government that causes or enables the underlying constitutional
violation. 163
A high-level supervising officer, an elected official such as the
Sheriff, also may be an initial target of the lawsuit. Such a high official
is, like the government itself, easily known: he often is publicly elected
or appointed, in the public eye, and easily found and named in the
original Complaint. But a supervisor also will not be liable on a
respondeat superior theory simply because an underling committed a
constitutional violation. A plaintiff must allege and show that the
supervisor committed (or omitted) some intentional or deliberately
indifferent act that deprived the plaintiff of her civil rights. 164 A
accommodated by post-Monell cases for imposition of municipal liability).
163 See Gilles, supra note 2, at 41-42 (describing the "failure to [blank]" model of municipal
liability in context of police training, where the failure is so obvious and so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 410 ('"[D]eliberate indifference' is
a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or
obvious consequence of his action."); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)
(holding that plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipal action leading the employer to violate
the Constitution was taken with deliberate indifference to its known or obvious consequence,
where the need for more or different training is so obvious and its inadequacy or absence so likely
to result in a constitutional violation); Beermann, supra note 23, at 659 (describing claims in
which the municipality is alleged to have shown disregard through failure to train employees,
maintain safe workplaces, or adequately screen employees); Blum, supra note 7, at 695 (arguing
that in failure-to-train cases there is no question about the underlying constitutional violation
committed by the non-policymaking employee, rather the issue is the level of culpability that the
plaintiff must prove to demonstrate that the municipality "caused" the violation); Gilles, supra
note 2, at 42-43 ("[P]laintiffs may simply point to a municipal omission, such as the failure of
municipal government to provide adequate training and services to its employees and
constituency."); Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 38, at 815-16 (describing "deliberate indifference"
as a surrogate for a demonstrated municipal policy).
164 See Kinports, supra note 36, at 150; id. at 169 (arguing that supervisory liability depends
on five factors, including the extent to which prior similar incidents involving those officers had
occurred, the supervisor's knowledge of and response to those prior incidents, and the nature of
the supervisor's awareness); see, e.g., Hartley v. Pamell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (1 1th Cir. 1999)
("Supervisory liability [under § 1983] occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in
the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection between actions of the
supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The causal connection can be
established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the
need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. The deprivations that constitute
widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant
and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences."); Colon v. Couglin, 58 F.3d 865, 873
(2d Cir. 1995) (citing Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)):
The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that:
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the
defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to
remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which
unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or
custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who
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plaintiff thus may have as much trouble bringing a viable claim against
a known supervisory officer as against the governmental entity itself.
Further, damages are entirely unavailable from governmental
entities above the municipal or county level. A state or state agency is
not a "person" for purposes of § 1983, meaning the state cannot even be
named as a defendant in a Complaint. 165 Moreover, Congress did not
abrogate state sovereign immunity when it passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 (of which § 1983 is § 1) because it never made a clear statement
of its intention to subject states to suit; from this, the Supreme Court
concludes that Congress never intended for states as entities to be
named as defendants or held liable for constitutional claims.1 66 At the
same time, Bivens actions can be brought only against individual federal
officers, not the United States or any federal agency employing or
supervising those officers. 167 No federal institutional defendant can be
sued, regardless of any policy, custom, or deliberately indifferent
failures by federal policymakers the plaintiff may attempt to plead.
This complex structure and limited institutional liability contrasts
with the relatively straightforward rules for entity or organizational
liability in common law tort actions.
Employers generally are
responsible for torts committed by employees in the scope of their
employment on the theory that the employer is the ultimate beneficiary
of actions taken within the scope of that employment.1 68 This liability
structure also contrasts with that of other federal civil rights laws, under
which the corporate or governmental actor, particularly an employer,
will be primarily or exclusively subject to suit and liability. 169
committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to
the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional
acts were occurring.
165 See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66, 71 (1989) (concluding that
a state is not a person within the meaning of§ 1983); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil
Rights Without Remedies. Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755,
773-74 (1999).
166 See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1978); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at
774 n.129.
167 See Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001) (stating that the "purpose of
Bivens is to deter individual federal officers from committing constitutional violations," but that
"the threat of suit against an individual's employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated
by Bivens"). The United States is liable for certain tort claims arising from the actions of federal
employees, but cannot be sued for constitutional violations by those employees. See 42 U.S.C. §
2679(b)(2) (2003) (denying lawsuit against the United States for civil actions arising from
violations of the Constitution of the United States).
168 See Beermann, supra note 23, at 646, 666 ("The common law's widespread acceptance of
vicarious liability exhibits a consensus that employers are responsible for the tortious conduct of
their employees.")
169 As Professors Fisk and Chemerinsky explain:
[T]he issue of vicarious liability is narrower under § 1983 than under other civil rights
statutes because the question is solely when, if at all, municipalities can be found liable
on a respondeat superior basis. The Court's answer has been to reject respondeat
superior liability in § 1983 claims, holding that municipalities are liable only for
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The upshot is that the primary, likely, and perhaps only, target of
liability for constitutional violations will be the individual wrongful
actor, not the governmental entity.' 70 Of course, the officer likely can
count on the government providing his counsel and defense and
indemnifying him for any judgment entered against him. 17 1 In other
words, the cost of litigation and judgment will be paid from the public
fisc. 172 However, the individual officer remains the defendant against

whom judgment will be entered, 73 meaning the officer must be the
named party in the controlling pleading and must be treated
procedurally as the true party defendant.
This liability regime demands that the plaintiff identify the
violations resulting from their own policies.
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 774; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2003) (guaranteeing
equal right to make and enforce contracts, including contracts with employers); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (2003) (defining liable entity in race and gender employment discrimination claims as
the "employer"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2003) (defining employer as "a person engaged in an
industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees," including state and local
governments and corporate and organizational entities); see also Meyer v. Holley, 123 S. Ct. 824,
828-29 (2003) (stating that the Fair Housing Act provides for vicarious liability, that a claim for
compensation for housing discrimination is, in effect, a tort action and the court assumes that
Congress intends its legislation to incorporate ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762-63 (1998) ("[A] tangible employment action
taken by the supervisor becomes for Title VII purposes the act of the employer ....
[W]hen a
supervisor takes a tangible employment action against a subordinate.., it would be implausible
to interpret agency principles to allow an employer to escape liability .. "); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) ("An employer is subject to vicarious liability [under Title
VII] to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.").
170 See Jefferies, supra note 23, at 59 (arguing that the municipal liability exception is a
narrow deviation from the generally applicable rule of liability based on individual fault and
arguing that the liability scheme forces civil rights plaintiffs to sue state officers rather than the
states themselves); Nahmod, Courtroom, supra note 36, at 638 ("By its very terms, then, 1983
makes individuals responsible for the constitutional harm they cause others."); see also Gilles,
supra note 2, at 39 (arguing that most § 1983 cases are based on "allegations of recurring,
unconstitutional local practices by rank-and-file officers").
171 See Jefferies, supra note 23, at 49-50 ("Very generally, a suit against a state officer is
functionally a suit against the state, for the state defends the action and pays any adverse
judgment."); see also Beermann, supra note 23, at 646 (arguing that the numerous municipalities
that indemnify their workers suggest the fairness of holding the employer responsible for
employee misconduct in the scope of employment); Gilles, supra note 2, at 30 ("The reality is
that individual officers are not often forced to pay damage awards from their own pockets.").
Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 38, at 828 (arguing that "we ignore reality if we forget that the
entity pays for the liability even if the individual defendant formally suffers the adverse
judgment"); Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of Federal Regulation of
Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1359 (2001) ("Were indemnification universal and
comprehensive, the resulting system would approximate direct governmental liability."); see also
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70 (stating that the threat of being sued provides adequate deterrence of the
individual officer, even if he will be indemnified by the employing agency or entity).
172 Cf Brown, supra note 6, at 1529-30 (arguing that the public derives the benefit of more
responsible government from extracting necessary tax dollars from the offending locale).
173 See Jefferies, supra note 23, at 50 (arguing that there is a difference between proceeding
directly against an officer as opposed to a government entity, as "[]uries confronting a flesh-andblood defendant may be less quick to play Robin Hood").
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individual officers who engaged in the unconstitutional conduct and
plead against them in a timely manner; the plaintiff can litigate
successfully only if and when she knows the names of those individual
actors. The paradox is that the obviousness of a potential defendant's
identity is inverse to the likelihood of that defendant's liability. The
most easily and obviously known and identified defendant in most cases
is the government entity, but its liability is unlikely, legally and
practically. The names of supervisory officers-elected officials such
as the Mayor or Sheriff-also might be obvious or easily learned, but
their liability is premised on a degree of involvement that generally is
absent.1 74 The primary target defendants, the individual officers who
committed the acts on the ground and who might be liable for the
violation, are least likely to be known by the plaintiff and most difficult
for the plaintiff or her counsel to identify, at least without the benefit of
formal discovery.

III.

SOLUTIONS TO THE JOHN DOE DEFENDANT PROBLEM IN

§ 1983

CASES

If, as Paul Carrington suggests, it is legitimate to favor some
1 75
substantive parties and issues with a thumb on the procedural scales,
the question is what that thumb should look like. Four approaches
might remedy the disparate impact that the narrow interpretation of
Rule 15(c)(3)(B) has on § 1983: 1) changing procedure to require a
plaintiff who knows she does not know the identity of the target
defendant to file her Complaint with more time remaining on the
limitations period; 2) changing substantive § 1983 law; 3) changing
procedure by changing Rule 15 and the rules for amending pleadings;
and 4) changing procedure by creating a mechanism to allow the
plaintiff to identify the target defendants prior to bringing the action,
through some form of limited formal pre-filing discovery. The
connection among all four is respect for the necessary and important
link between substance and procedure, a recognition that an adjustment
to one necessarily produces an adjustment to the other. 176 While any of
these changes would be positive legal developments, only the pre-filing
discovery procedure will guarantee that the whole class of constitutional
174 See Gilles, supra note 2, at 39 (arguing that cases rarely involve singular actions by higher

ranking municipal officers, as opposed to rank-and-file officers).
175 See Carrington, Making Rules, supra note 52, at 2085; see discussion supra notes 51-65
and accompanying text.
176 See Bone, supra note 52, at 889 (recognizing that "procedure has substantive effects");

Hyman, supra note 44, at 1391 ("Procedure is the ways and means of substantive law. By
specifying the mechanisms for administrative enforcement and judicial review, procedure helps
ensure the outcome dictated by the substantive law.").

2003]

A STUDY IN SECTION 1983 PROCEDURE

829

damages plaintiffs is ensured of an opportunity to pursue a remedy in
those cases in which she does not know the responsible officers at the
outset.
A.

Suing Early

The simplest and most intuitive solution is for the plaintiff simply
to sue earlier, rather than waiting until the end of the limitations period
to go into court, as Mrs. Hall did.' 77 No substantive or procedural
changes are necessary; the plaintiff simply must adjust her litigation
strategy to account for her initial lack of knowledge as to the officers'
identities and to leave enough time to discover those identities and
amend the pleadings before the limitations period expires.
As Edward Cooper suggests, a plaintiff in this position knows that
if she waits until the end of the limitations period to commence her
action, she may be unable to take discovery, learn the names of the
individual officers, seek leave from the court to amend, and file and
serve the Amended Complaint, all before the period has run as to the
individual officers. 178 Arguably the burden should be on the plaintiff to
commence her action well before the limitations period has expired
when she knows that she does not know the identity of the proper
person to be sued.' 79 There would be no need for the Amended
Complaint to relate back, because it would be timely standing alone.
Leave to file such a timely amended pleading almost certainly will be
granted, given the general presumption in favor of permitting timely
amendment "when justice so requires.' ' 0
The early-commencement approach may be more workable since
the 2000 amendments governing mandatory initial disclosure. In all

177 See discussion supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
178 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 4.
179 See id.; see, e.g., Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1104 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("[Plaintiff] bears
the consequences of his own delay. Had he filed earlier, he could have learned the deputy
sheriffs' identities in time to amend his complaint before the statute of limitations ran.").
180 SeeFomanv. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962):
In the absence of any apparent or declared reasons-such as undue delay, bad faith,
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the leave sought should, as the rules require,
be "freely given."
Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (providing that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so
requires"); see also Rice, supra note 16, at 899 n.49. Note the difference between obtaining leave
to amend under Rule 15(a) and relating back under Rule 15(c). While relation back presently is
not permissible when the plaintiff does not know the target defendants' names at the outset, see
discussion supra notes 106-49 and accompanying text, that lack of knowledge should be a
sufficient justification for granting amendment when no limitations period is at issue.
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district courts,' 8' in most cases, 82 each party must disclose at the outset
of the case, without awaiting a discovery request, 183 the name and other
information about "each individual likely to have discoverable
information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or
defenses ... identifying the subjects of the information."'1 84 A party
need disclose only those witnesses who will support a defense, those
85
who possess favorable information.
The names of the officers who were involved in or present at a
constitutional deprivation should be disclosed under the new Rule
26(a)(1) standard. Testimony and evidence from the officers who were
present at the time of some unconstitutional conduct would support
most defenses that the government entity might raise. Only those
officers could testify as to whether the plaintiffs version of events is
accurate or whether something else occurred that made the use of force
reasonable. 186
Imagine that Mrs. Hall files her action one year after her husband's
death and serves the Complaint one month later, leaving eleven months
remaining on the incorporated Georgia two-year limitations period.
181See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee's note to 2000 Amendment (stating that the
amended disclosure provisions were amended to establish a nationally uniform practice); see also
Carl Tobias, The 2000 Federal Rules Revisions, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 875, 881 (2001)
[hereinafter Tobias, Revisions] (stating that the 2000 amendments made mandatory disclosure
rules apply nationally in all federal district courts, a change from the opt-out permitted under the
original initial disclosure rule and describing the "notion that the opt-out measure had
additionally fractured the already fragmented condition of federal civil practice because the
mechanism encouraged the district courts to institute local disclosure procedures that diverged
from the federal disclosure strictures or to reject them altogether"). The original opt-out rule was
the subject of a great deal of scholarly criticism. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee's
note to 2000 Amendment ("The Committee has discerned widespread support for national
uniformity."); see, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal
Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 947 (1996) [hereinafter Carrington, New Confederacy] ("While there
are no visible benefits to most local rules, their vices are obvious. Local rulemaking dealing with
matters that are also the subject of national rules is in almost every instance at odds with the
primary aims of the Rules Enabling Act.").
182See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(I)(E) (enumerating categories of cases excluded by mandatory
disclosures, including cases brought by uncounseled persons and prisoners).
183 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (providing that mandatory disclosures must be made within
fourteen days after a discovery conference); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(0 (providing for parties to hold
discovery conference at least twenty-one days prior to a Rule 16 Pre-Trial Conference with the
district court).
184 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A). This disclosure requirement is narrower than the 1993
rule, which required disclosure of identities of individuals "likely to have discoverable
information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings." See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee's note to 2000 Amendment ("The initial disclosure obligation...
has been narrowed to identification of witnesses and documents that the disclosing party may use
to support its claims or defenses.").
185 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee's notes to 2000 Amendments.
186 For example, Baker County might want to argue that the force used was reasonable under
the circumstances, because Robert Hall reached for a gun as he alighted from the car, permitting
the officers to defend themselves. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 93 (1945); Bracey,
supra note 1, at 711. The three officers could provide evidence on that point.
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Baker County, the only named defendant, might disclose the names of
the three officers automatically within two or three months. Armed
with the names, she now moves to amend to name Screws, Kelley, and
Jones in an Amended Complaint that would be timely and her motion
for leave to amend almost certainly will be granted.
But automatic disclosure of the identities is not guaranteed, given
the narrow scope of evidence that "support[s]" a defense. If, like most
government entity defendants, Baker County wants to argue that its
policies and training programs were sufficient and unconnected to any
unconstitutional conduct by its officers, it could support that defense
without evidence or testimony from the officers themselves, in which
case their identities need not be disclosed. Mrs. Hall still may learn the
names through discovery requests directed to the government, where
87
information sought merely must be "relevant" to a party's defense.
However, it may take longer to obtain this information if she must
submit, and await answers to, formal discovery, all while the limitations
clock is ticking.
This may require Mrs. Hall to file the lawsuit even sooner than one
year after the incident, in order to gain necessary additional time to
engage in this discovery. Considering the possibility of delays in
obtaining counsel, understanding her rights, and readying herself to
litigate (not to mention time to grieve for her husband), such timing
obligations become onerous. They become even more onerous in states
that apply a one-year limitations period to § 1983,188 perhaps forcing the
plaintiff to file within a few months of the event itself.
Moreover, it is intuitively unfair to make early filing the standard
procedural command. 89 As Chief Judge Becker of the Third Circuit
argued, demanding that the plaintiff sue early in all cases in order to
avoid the relation back problem effectively renders the § 1983
limitations period much shorter for a plaintiff who does not know her
assailants than for plaintiffs with identical claims who happen to know
the names of their assailants. 90 The dichotomy becomes more
troubling because the more severe the constitutional injury (if not the
more severe the constitutional violation), the less likely that the victim
will have been able to identify the officer and the more likely that she
187 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party .... ").
188 See Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482, 1485 (9th
Cir. 1994).
189 See Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 201 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001)
("There seems to be no good reason to disadvantage plaintiffs in this way simply because, for
example, they were not able to see the name tag of the offending state actor.").
190 See id at 190, 201 n.5; see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146 n.3 (1988) (stating that
one problem with a state statute requiring § 1983 plaintiffs to file a notice of the claim with the
municipality prior to filing suit was that it "drastically reduces" the length of the limitations
period).
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must sue early. The victim of an unconstitutional arrest, in which the
plaintiff merely asserts that there was no probable cause to take her into
custody or that her arrest violated the First Amendment, might have had
a better opportunity to see the officers' name tag than the victim of
some rough handling during an arrest, who might have had a better
opportunity to see the name tag than the late Robert Hall.
The most problematic aspect of an early filing requirement is that
the resultant shortened filing period is inconsistent with the theory
underlying statutes of limitations. The length of any limitations period
is within the discretion of the legislature and ultimately arbitrary,
grounded, the Supreme Court has said, in convenience and expediency
rather than any reason or logic. 9 1 But the Court has suggested that the
applicable limitations period incorporated into § 1983 must be
"responsive" to the characteristics of federal constitutional litigation and
must be of sufficient length to take into account "practicalities that are
involved in litigating federal civil rights claims and policies that are
analogous to the goals of the Civil Rights Acts."' 92 The limitations
period must be long enough to accommodate the "considerable
preparation" involved in litigating civil rights claims, particularly in
193
recognizing the constitutional dimensions of the injury.
In other words, the borrowed limitations period cannot be so short
as to constrict the plaintiffs ability to prepare her Complaint and
proceed with her action. It follows that the plaintiff controls when
within that period the action will be commenced.194 Once a limitations
period is set, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the entire period to
191 See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) ("Statutes of limitations find
their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients,
rather than principles."); see id at 313 ("Statutes of limitations always have vexed the
philosophical mind .. ");Bauer, supra note 42, at 731 ("[T]he function of a statute of
limitations is to provide some admittedly arbitrary date by which the plaintiff must commence the
action.").
192 Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984); see also Felder, 487 U.S. at 139-40 ("[Wie
have disapproved the adoption of state statutes of limitation that provide only a truncated period
of time within which to file suit, because such statutes inadequately accommodate the
complexities of federal civil rights litigation and are thus inconsistent with Congress'
compensatory aims.").
193 See Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50:
An injured person must recognize the constitutional dimensions of his injury. He must
obtain counsel, or prepare to proceed pro se. He must conduct enough investigation to
draft pleadings that meet the requirements of federal rules; he must also establish the
amount of his damages, prepare legal documents .... At the same time, the litigant
must look ahead to the responsibilities that immediately follow filing of a complaint.
He must be prepared to withstand various responses, such as a motion to dismiss, as
well as to undertake additional discovery.
194 Cf Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules ofDecision Act: In Search of
the AppropriateDilemma, 91 HARV. L. REv 356, 375 (1977) (arguing that a plaintiff has wide
choice of timing in bringing suit within the confines established by the applicable limitations
period).
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investigate, prepare, and file her claim, if she elects to use it. The
plaintiff perhaps obtains a strategic advantage from waiting the entire
period; anticipating bringing a claim, she takes steps to preserve and
gather favorable evidence while evidence favorable to the defendant
deteriorates, with the defendant all the while unaware of the looming
lawsuit or even of having done anything wrong.195 That, however, is an
incidental benefit that runs with the length of the limitations period.
The limitations period represents the point at which any delay, and any
benefit to the plaintiff from that delay, becomes unreasonable or
unfair.

196

Relation back is "intimately connected" with the statute of
limitations, meaning their underlying policies run together. 97 A
procedural rule that shortens the period for an entire class of plaintiffs is
inconsistent with limitations policies, denying plaintiffs the full
statutory period to which they are entitled for filing the Complaint.
Rather, consistency and uniformity between the statute of limitations
and relation back demand that a plaintiff have the opportunity to use the
entire limitations period while also having the opportunity to assert
timely claims, either in the initial pleading or by relating back claims in
an amended pleading. The point is that systematically demanding that a
plaintiff such as Mrs. Hall sue early when she does not know the names
of the individual officer defendants does not properly reconcile
limitations and relation back. It therefore cannot provide a broad
solution to the dilemma of John Doe pleading.
B.

ChangingSubstantive Law

Our primary concern, at bottom, is the unique impact the narrow
interpretation of Rule 15(c)(3) relation back has on § 1983, in light of
the likelihood of a civil rights plaintiff not knowing the individual
defendant and the complex liability scheme that demands a plaintiff
discover that individual defendant. 198 A second workable remedy
would be to change substantive law, thereby eliminating the procedural
195 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 99, at 484; id. at 484-85 (describing cases in which
defendant does not realize that she did anything wrong and has no reason to preserve or gather
evidence, while the plaintiff, aware of the injury, has a greater recollection of events and greater
evidence to preserve and gather evidence, but rejecting the idea of a plaintiff lying in wait as
"fanciful"); see also Redish & Phillips, supra note 194, at 375 (arguing that the choice of timing
is one litigation option afforded to the plaintiff and denied to the defendant).
196 See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 99, at 483-84 (stating that one purpose "is to avoid
making it unreasonably difficult for defendants to answer the claims against them" and to give
both parties an equal opportunity to gather evidence while facts are fresh) (emphasis added).
197 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's notes to 1966 Amendment; see discussion
supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
198 See discussion supra notes 150-74 and accompanying text.
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problems created by the interaction between the rules and that
substantive law.
A new liability regime for constitutional damages actions would
emphasize the liability of the governmental entity and de-emphasize the
liability of the individual officers. Both purposes of § 1983 (and
Bivens)-compensation and deterrence-would be better served by
making the government primarily responsible for damages caused by
the unconstitutional conduct of its officers. 199 Moreover, the nearuniversal acceptance of government indemnification of individual
officers, pursuant to which government itself bears the cost of defense
and judgment, logically suggests the next step of making government
200
the named defendant, the proper and formally liable party.
Indeed, John Jefferies suggests that having the government, rather
20 1
than the officer, as the defendant affects how the jury views the case.
It follows that having judgment entered and damages assessed against
the government, rather than against the officer, affects the amount of
governmental deterrence achieved by that judgment, producing greater
institutional deterrence. Commentators thus urge respondeat superior
liability, under which government will be liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of its officers committed under color of law-that is, for the
misuse of power in furtherance of or pursuant to official powers or
apparent authority possessed by virtue of state law and made possible

199 See Brown, supra note 6, at 1540 ("[G]ovemment should be held accountable for the
harms it causes."); Gilles, supra note 2, at 29 (arguing that municipal liability is a precondition to
meaningful recovery of damages for constitutional violations); id. at 32 (arguing that municipal
liability for injuries caused by its officers makes it more likely that the municipality will take
steps to remedy broader constitutional problems); see also Beermann, supra note 23, at 646
(arguing that broader municipal liability "would improve the prospects of compensation, since
municipalities are more likely to have sufficient reachable assets than individual officers," which
would improve deterrence by providing added incentives to municipality to prevent employees
from committing constitutional violations); Brown, supra note 6, at 1523 ("[Olverdeterrence
discourages risky conduct that might harm others in an unconstitutional fashion."); Lewis &
Blumoff, supra note 38, at 826 ("[G]overnment entity defendants should be the chief and ultimate
targets of § 1983 proscriptions .... "); Whitman, Government Responsibility, supra note 6, at
258:
[A] government defendant can fairly be required to be more responsive to broad
community values in a way that would be an inappropriate imposition on private or
individual conduct, for the government is charged to reflect the goals of society as a
whole rather than the narrower self-interest permitted private actors.
Id.; see discussion supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
200 See Beermann, supra note 23, at 646 (arguing that the numerous municipalities that
indemnify their workers suggest the fairness of holding the employer responsible for employee
misconduct in the scope of employment); Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 38, at 828 (arguing that
"we ignore reality if we forget that the entity pays for the liability even if the individual defendant
formally suffers the adverse judgment"); Meltzer, supra note 171, at 1359 ("Were
indemnification universal and comprehensive, the resulting system would approximate direct
governmental liability."); see discussion supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
201 See Jefferies, supra note 23, at 50 ("Juries confronting a flesh-and-blood defendant may be
less quick to play Robin Hood.").
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only because the individual wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
202
state law.
The effect of such a change on pleading and procedure will be to
enable the plaintiff to name the government (a known and obvious
entity) as the sole defendant, within the limitations period and the time

required for service of process. There would be no need to identify or
pursue individual officers, thus no need to sue John Doe, to use

discovery to identify Doe, or to amend or relate back pleadings naming
the individual officers. To the extent the plaintiff misnames the
government entity in the original Complaint, for example by suing the
Baker County Sheriffs Department rather than Baker County, it would
be a mistake equivalent to suing the Department of Health and Human
Services rather than the Secretary, the paradigmatic misnomer or
misidentification in which the 1966 Amendments

intended to permit

relation back. 20 3 The procedural benefits in unknown-officer cases
provide an additional argument in favor of extending governmental
entity liability for constitutional claims.
There perhaps is some question as to the source of these
substantive changes, Congress or the courts. On one hand, although
Congress retains the power to amend a statute, Michael Gerhardt argues
that Congress has seemed disposed to leave the contours of § 1983 to
the courts. 20 4 There has been no groundswell of political support for
statutory amendment, either from interested parties outside Congress or
from within Congress itself.20 5 This suggests that legislative change is
202 See Beermann, supra note 23, at 666 ("[F]aimess concerns, as well as the policies
underlying § 1983, point toward a regime of vicarious liability."); id. ("The common law's
widespread acceptance of vicarious liability exhibits a consensus that employers are responsible
for the tortuous conduct of their employees .... Often municipalities are behind violations in
ways that are difficult to prove and would not stand up to scrutiny under the Monell rule."); Lewis
& Blumoff, supra note 38, at 828 ("[I]f the plaintiff can demonstrate a violation of her federal
rights, the only remaining question we should ask before attaching liability to the entity is
whether it can fairly be charged with the conduct."); id.at 836 (rejecting the need for a finding of
entity fault, because neither the text nor history of § 1983 suggests that compensation should be
limited only to violations that reflect "fault"); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961)
(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941)) (defining "under color of law").
203 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's notes to 1966 Amendment (stating that to
deny relation back in cases in which the plaintiff has misnamed the government entity is "to
defeat unjustly the claimant's opportunity to prove his case"); see discussion supra notes 93-97
and accompanying text.
204 See Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 686 ("Congress seems disposed to leave the future of
municipal litigation under § 1983 for the federal courts to decide."); id.at 681 (arguing that the
federal judiciary has largely dictated the fate of § 1983 municipal liability).
205 See id. at 680 ("[Nlone of the groups one would expect to have an interest in amending §
1983 have moved to amend nor succeeded in reforming § 1983."); id.("The failure to influence
Congress is a function to some extent of states, cities, and other interested parties not having had
such sufficient incentive for pressuring Congress to amend § 1983."); id at 680 (arguing that
there is an absence of the "means, pressures, or incentives for a critical mass of members of
Congress to amend § 1983"); id. at 681 (noting that the federal judiciary has not lobbied Congress
for reform of§ 1983, as it did in other areas, such as habeas corpus).
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unlikely. 20 6 On the other hand, aside from the dissent of three
Justices, 2 0 7 there is no serious judicial movement towards
reconsideration of Monell or its problematic applications.
Four substantive statutory or doctrinal changes would be necessary
to resolve the disconnect between relation back and John Doe
defendants in all constitutional damages litigation against all levels of
government. Municipal, local, and county government liability requires
the rejection of Monell and its progeny in favor of respondeatsuperior
liability. Several commentators have argued that the doctrinal evolution
of municipal liability since Monell has been grounded not in the text or
history of § 1983, but purely on judicial concerns for the policy
implications of imposing broader, vicarious liability on government
entities. 20 8 A more historically and textually justified regime may be in
order.
As for states and state agencies, several judicial decisions must be
overruled in order to recognize or establish both that state governments
are persons for § 1983 purposes and that Congress in 1871 did, or
Congress presently does, intend to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment
immunity through § 1983.209 Both aspects of § 1983 must be changed
206 See id. at 683 ("[T]he absence of any real reform of § 1983 suggests that considerable
mobilization would have to occur and considerable pressure would have to be brought to bear in
order to effectuate meaningful change.").
207 See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430-31 (1997)
(Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting); id. at 433 ("Monell's basic effort to
distinguish between vicarious liability and liability derived from 'policy or custom' has produced
a body of law that is neither readily understandable nor easy to apply."); see also Brown, supra
note 6, at 1516 (noting doubt cast by three Justices on viability of current municipal liability
regime); Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 676 (noting that three Justices found all the prerequisites for
reconsidering Monell present, including the doubtfulness of the original principal and the
complex body of law that had developed around the principal); see also Beermann, supra note 23,
at 665 ("The rule is so complicated that a change to a more definite rule, whether expanding or
shrinking municipal liability, could save litigation expenses.").
208 As Jack Beerman has argued,
The Court's municipal liability jurisprudence differs in that it is dominated by an
underdeveloped analysis of text and legislative history with little attention to either the
common law background against which the statute was passed or more recent common
law developments, both of which may point toward broad municipal liability for the
constitutional violations of employees. In my view, this is because the Court is
concerned about the policy implications of broad vicarious municipal liability.
Beermann, supra note 23, at 627; id at 642 ("[T]he Court has not offered a satisfactory
justification for rejecting vicarious municipal liability."); Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 675
(describing the Brown Court's "rejection of any pretense that its analysis was grounded in the text
or actual legislative history of § 1983"); see also Bandes, supra note 156, at 620 (arguing that
commentators have shown that the Monell analysis is not clothed in text and history, but is "often
frankly policy-oriented and strikingly uninterested in the legislative history or even the text of the
statute"); cf Gilles, supra note 2, at 49 ("[Tlhe 'custom' language of § 1983 has indeed been lost,
and the very evils that it was designed to address-the unwritten codes of conduct that permeated
local officialdom-are precisely the evils that are least accommodated by post-Monell bases for
imposition of municipal liability.").
209 See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66, 71 (1989) (concluding that
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to make the State or agency vicariously liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of state-level officers. 210 Once again, these changes could
come from the Supreme Court, although the direction of recent
sovereign immunity doctrine suggests that a majority is not receptive to
any broadening of state susceptibility to suit under federal law. 21' Or
they could come from Congress willing to reenact § 1983,212 expressly
defining "person" to include states and state agencies and, exercising its
power under section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, explicitly
abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity and subjecting states, as
213
entities, to suit and damages liability for constitutional violations.
a State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983); Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979)
("[S]ection] 1983 does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep
away the immunity of the States; nor does it have a history which focuses directly on the question
of state liability and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States."); see also Lewis & Blumnoff, supra note 38, at 826
(arguing that Will is "virtually irreconcilable" with the premise that government entity defendants
should be the chief and ultimate target of § 1983 proscriptions); see discussion supra notes 16566 and accompanying text.
210 Compare Brown, supra note 6, at 1516 (arguing that many revisions to Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence would be necessary to construct a consistent and workable approach to
state liability), with Jefferies, supra note 23, at 59 (arguing that the main, beneficial effect of the
Eleventh Amendment is the fact that it forces civil rights plaintiffs to sue state officers rather than
the states themselves); see also Lewis & Blumoff, supra note 38, at 827 ("Conduct fairly
attributable to government that causes the deprivation of federally secured rights should be
subject to judicial oversight and a federal remedy in a proceeding under federal law ... ").
211 See, e.g. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747
(2002) (holding that state sovereign immunity bars federal administrative agency from
adjudicating private party's complaint against state-run port); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000) (holding that congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity
in Age Discrimination in Employment Act exceeded Congress' authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) ("[T]he powers delegated to
Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject
nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in state courts.").
212 Congress did something similar in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Act amended 42
U.S.C. § 1981, which originally had been part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Congress added sections (b) and (c) to
§ 1981, establishing that the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes "the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." Congress expressly intended to
undo several restrictive Supreme Court decisions and to "expand[] the scope of relevant civil
rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination." Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, § 3 (1991).
213 This would present the open question of whether, in light of the Supreme Court's recent,
more-restrictive approach towards congressional power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment,
Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity through this newly re-enacted § 1983. See
Karlan, supra note 39, at 193-94. Congress has the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce the provisions of the Amendment through "appropriate legislation." See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (1868). The Court continues to insist that Congress retains power
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity acting through its § 5 power, so long as it stays
within the scope of the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment or shows
"congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end." See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365
(2001). A legislative enactment that regulates only conduct judicially defined to violate the
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But that change is unlikely to get through Congress given the obvious

federalism implications of subjecting states directly to suit and liability
under § 1983.214
Finally, the United States must be made subject to suit for damages
The
for constitutional violations committed by federal officers.
Supreme Court is unlikely to establish this change, given its
disinclination to extend the judicially created Bivens remedy. 21 5 Under
FDIC v. Meyer,2 16 a Bivens action is not permitted against a federal
agency, only against an individual federal officer.2 17 The purpose of

Bivens, the Court insists, is deterrence of individual wrongdoing only,
not agency wrongdoing. 2t 8 Meyer was unanimous and there is no
suggestion, even from the dissenters in Correctional Services
Corporation v. Malesko (in which the majority declined to extend
Bivens to a private corporate entity operating a federal prison under
contract with the federal government), that Bivens should reach the

Constitution, one that merely supplies a vehicle for remedying a constitutional violation, should
not require the same demonstration of need in order to hold states liable. Evan H. Caminker,
"Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1157
(2001); see also Karlan, supra note 39, at 192-93 (arguing that it is difficult to justify an Eleventh
Amendment constraint on congressional power to enforce the type of discrimination the
Constitution already prohibits). A statute reaching only instances of actual unconstitutional
conduct is more easily viewed as "remedial," without requiring any additional congressional
showing. See Meltzer, supra note 171, at 1348. For example, Daniel Meltzer suggests that if
Congress were to enact a statute making it a federal crime for a person acting under color of state
law to participate in a lynching (which Meltzer views as a clear due process violation), that
defendant could not defend on the ground that lynching is not widespread or persistent. See id.
That is precisely what a re-enacted § 1983 would be, at least as applied to constitutional
claims-a congressional enactment prohibiting precisely and only the conduct that the Fourteenth
Amendment (and the incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights) already prohibits. There
would be perfect congruence and proportionality between what the statute prohibits and what the
Constitution prohibits. For the Court to hold that such a version of § 1983 impermissibly
abrogates the Eleventh Amendment would be to acknowledge, effectively, that Congress never,
under any circumstances, can abrogate state sovereign immunity, even when exercising § 5
powers. Cf Karlan, supra note 39, at 194 ("[N]othing in Will suggested that Congress would
have lacked the power to include states within § 1983's purely corrective ambit."); see Nevada
Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1984 (2003) (holding that states can be sued
for damages under the Family and Medical Leave Act, because the Act is congruent and
proportional to the remedial object of preventing unconstitutional gender discrimination).
214 See Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 679-80 (emphasizing the federalism concerns raised by any
proposal subjecting state and local governments to suit that might deter a majority in Congress
from amending § 1983 to broaden government entity liability).
215 See Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) "[W]e have consistently refused
to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of defendants."); id. at 75 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (describing Bivens as a "relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed
common-law powers to create causes of action").
216 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
217 See id. at 484-86.
218 See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70 ("The purpose of Bivens is to deter individual federal officers
from committing constitutional violations. Meyer made clear that the threat of litigation and
liability will adequately deter federal officers .... "); id. ("Meyer also made clear that the threat of
a suit against an individual's employer was not the kind of deterrence contemplated by Bivens.").
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federal government and federal agencies.2 19 Once again, it would be up
to Congress to permit such a suit against the United States or an agency,
by waiving federal sovereign immunity through an amendment to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, which currently prohibits damages suits
against the United States to remedy constitutional violations by federal
220
officers.
C.

ChangingProcedure:Rule 15 andRelation Back

If substantive liability structures of § 1983 and Bivens remain
unchanged, we must alter procedural rules to handle the unknown
defendant problem in light of that substantive law. 22 1 There must be
some procedural mechanism that will enable a § 1983 or Bivens plaintiff
to identify and name the individual officers as defendants in the
Amended Complaint, while avoiding the statute of limitations. The
most obvious starting point is Rule 15, which controls the amending of
pleadings and the intersection of pleading and limitations periods.
1.

Re-interpret Rule 15(c)(3)

One approach is to re-interpret the present language of Rule
15(c)(3)(B) to recognize that a "mistake concerning the identity of the
party to be sued" can include a lack of knowledge or ignorance
concerning that identity. Courts and commentators rejecting this
interpretation of mistake simply have declared that lack of knowledge is
not a mistake. 222 However, it is not clear why this is so. A reasonable
219 See id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accepting the conclusion in Meyers that federal
agencies may not be sued under Bivens, but arguing that that does not lead to the outcome in
Malesko that a corporate agent of the federal government cannot be sued under Bivens).
220 See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2003) (denying lawsuit for damages against the United
States for civil actions arising from violations of the Constitution of the United States by
government employees).
221 Cf John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth ofErie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974) ("We
have, I think, some moderately clear notion of what a procedural rule is-one designed to make
the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes."); Hyman,
supra note 44, at 391 ("Procedure is the ways and means of substantive law.").
222 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 3 ("The plaintiff knew from the beginning that he did not
know the identity of the proper defendants. This was ignorance, not mistake."); Rice, supra note
16, at 926 ("A Doe allegation simply is not a mistake."); id. at 952 ("[T]he initial pleading a Doe
defendant is not a 'mistake."'); see also Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466, 470
(2d Cir. 1996) ("Rule 15(c) does not allow an amended complaint adding new defendants to
relate back if the newly-added defendants were not named originally because the plaintiff did not
know their identities."); Worthington v, Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1257 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
failure to name individual defendants was due to a lack of knowledge as to their identities, not a
mistake).
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definition of the word mistake might include lack of knowledge or
ignorance as the cause of an unintentional or wrong action or
statement. 22 3 Rule 15(c)(3)(B) could be interpreted as permitting
relation back where the to-be-added defendant knew that, but for the
plaintiffs unintentional and wrong action in not naming the defendant
in the original pleading due to a lack of knowledge or ignorance
concerning his identity, that defendant would have been named in the
first instance. Mrs. Hall did not name Screws, Kelley, or Jones in her
original Complaint because she did not know their names. This was a
mistake concerning their identities, in the sense of being a wrong action
proceeding from inadequate knowledge or ignorance as to those
identities. Allowing relation back in Doe cases thus comports with the
22 4
language of Rule 15(c)(3)(B), subject to notice requirements.
One still could argue that lack of knowledge or ignorance does not
comport with the most common understanding of mistake. 225 It then
becomes relevant that, to paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall, it is a rule
of procedure we are expounding.2 26 Commentators have argued that
courts (or at least the Supreme Court) retain greater freedom and should
be less bound by plain meaning in interpreting and applying procedural
rules than in interpreting and applying congressionally enacted
substantive statutes. 227
This derives from the Court's primary
responsibility under the Rules Enabling Act for promulgating the rules
of procedure. 228 The Court created the rules it is interpreting, meaning
223 See WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1446 (1966) (defining mistake as

"wrong action or statement proceeding from faulty judgment, inadequate knowledge, or
inattention) (emphasis added); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. abridged 1990) (defining

mistake as "some unintentional act, omission, or error arising from ignorance, surprise,
imposition, or misplaced confidence) (emphasis added); id. ("It may arise either from
unconsciousness, ignorance, forgetfulness, imposition, or misplaced confidence.") (emphasis
added).
224 See discussion infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text; see discussion supra notes 8692, 98-105 and accompanying text.
225 See Engrav, supra note 31, at 1585.
226 Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
227 See Moore, supra note 42, at 1040 ("[T]he Supreme Court should take a more activist role
in interpreting the Federal Rules by including an analysis of purpose and policy and should
refrain from excessive reliance upon the plain meaning doctrine."); see also Bauer, supra note 42,
at 720 ("[C]ourts should recognize that their role is different from the one they play in
interpreting statutes or in applying substantive common law doctrines .... ");Joan Steinman,
After Steel Co.: "HypotheticalJurisdiction" in the FederalAppellate Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REv 855, 945-46 (2001) ("[A]s the Court's creation, the Rules should be subject to judicial
relaxation ...").
228 See Moore, supra note 42, at 1049 (stating that Congress has given the Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules of procedure, but has retained the power to consider and reject
procedural rules of which it does not approve). Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme
Court promulgates rules of process and procedure, as recommended by the standing Rules
Advisory Committee. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (a)(1) (2003). The Court transmits each proposed
rule to Congress by May I and the rule automatically takes effect on December I of that year,
unless Congress by law disapproves of the proposed rule. See Id § 2074(a) (2003). Congress
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there are fewer separation of powers concerns with the Court taking a
2 29
more expansive interpretive role.
These commentators further suggest that the Court must interpret
the text of one rule in light of its conformity with other aspects of that
rule and the rules as a whole. 230 A particular rule also should be read in
light of the systemic goal of fair, efficient, and just litigation. 231 The
purpose of Rule 15(c) is to ensure that an action proceeds if the intended
defendant receives timely notice of the pendency and nature of the
action against him and to ensure that the merits of the claim against the
target defendant are not foreclosed. 232 With this purpose in mind, courts
are justified in understanding mistake more broadly, in furtherance of
the rule's purpose of avoiding the limitations bar and enabling the
plaintiff to proceed in spite of an initial procedural error in identifying
the target defendant. This guarantees the benefit of relation back to all
plaintiffs, including those forced to resort to Doe pleading, because the
circumstances underlying the events giving rise to the cause of action
prevent her from knowing that identity at the outset.
This interpretive leeway also permits the Court to apply rules in a
way that accounts for the changed paradigm of civil litigation reflected
in § 1983 and Bivens. 233 Section 1983 cases demand an interpretation
of Rule 15(c) that recognizes that individual officers, the primarily
liable defendants, are more likely to be unknown and that civil rights
plaintiffs must be able to identify and proceed against those individual
officers without the burden of a strict limitations bar. 234 Interpreting
"mistake" to include lack of knowledge or ignorance better fits the new
paradigm by making relation back more readily available to a common
class of civil rights plaintiffs.
also retains power to establish procedural rules through ordinary legislation. See Moore, supra
note 42, at 1055-56. Although such a statute is procedural, the Court's interpretation would be
different from its interpretation of rules.
229 See Moore, supra note 42, at 1085 ("[B]ecause the Court is interpreting Rules that are
supposed to be at least in part of its own work product, such interpretation does not implicate
congressional powers in the way that statutory interpretation does."); id.at 1092 (arguing that
there is no separation of powers problem if the Court considers purpose and policy ininterpreting
the rules, because the Court is exercising its own Article III powers and not interfering with
Congress's own separate powers); see also Bauer, supra note 42, at 720 ("[Tjhe courts are
interpreting standards which the Supreme Court itself has promulgated."); Steinman, supra note
227, at 945-46 ("[T]he separation of powers issues.., are not so acute if federal courts take
some liberties with Federal Rules.").
230 See Moore, supranote 42, at 1084.
231 See id. at 1084-85; see also Bauer, supra note 42, at 720 ("[T]he federal courts are fully
justified in taking an expansive view of the Federal Rule under scrutiny, giving it a liberal reading
if that is required to fulfill the purposes of the Rule or to do justice between the parties before the
court."). But see Johnston, supra note 42, at 1375-76 ("References to the Rule 1 trinity and
'liberal' interpretations of other Rules to secure resolution on the merits can be misleading .
232 See Bauer, supra note 42, at 731.
233 See discussion supranotes 47-73 and accompanying text.
234 See discussion supranotes 151-74 and accompanying text.
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Amend Rule 15(c)(3)(B)

The most commonly proposed solution to the John Doe problem
among judges and commentators would amend Rule 15(c)(3)(B)
expressly to permit relation back where there was either a mistake or a
lack of information or knowledge or ignorance concerning the identity
of the proper party. 235 Edward Cooper has questioned just how many
23 6
cases such an amendment, attractive though it may be, will reach.
It will reach some cases, of course, most importantly Mrs. Hall's.
Her original Complaint named Sheriff's Deputies John Doe 1-3 as
defendants because Mrs. Hall did not know who the three officers were.
She was not present at the incident at issue and her husband, who
obviously was present, is dead. The identities of the arresting officers
are known to the County, supervising officers, and the arresting officers,
none of whom are forthcoming. This is reasonable ignorance or lack of
information as to the proper party, satisfying an amended rule.
3.

The Good and the Bad of Expanding Rule 15
a.

Operation of Rule 15

The real effect of an amended or re-interpreted mistake clause will
be to shift the analytical focus of Rule 15(c)(3) to the notice element, to
the question of whether the target defendants received notice within the
requisite time frame of 120 days from the filing of the original
Complaint 237 that the lawsuit had been instituted and that they were
235 Cooper, supra note 20, at 9 (proposing amendment to provide for relation back when the
defendant to be added "knew or should have known that, but for a mistake or lack of inform ation
concerning the identity of the proper party the action would have been brought against the party")
(emphasis added); Rice, supra note 16, at 953 (proposing amendment to "but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party or the alleged lack of knowledge as to the proper
party's identity") (emphasis added); Engrav, supra note 31, at 1586 (proposing amendment to
"knew or should have that, but for the movant's lack of knowledge of the properparty, or a
mistake concerning the identity of the party") (emphasis added); see also Singletary v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186. 202 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (urging the Rules Advisory
Committee to amend Rule 15(c)(3) to adopt Cooper's proposed amendment). But cf Moore,
supra note 42, at 1040 (arguing that a more activist judicial role in rule interpretation avoids
unduly stingy applications of rules, in turn voiding unnecessary amendments). As this article
went to press, the Rules Advisory Committee, acting on Chief Judge Becker's suggestion, was
exploring amendments to Rule 15, including expressly allowing relation back where the identity
of the proper party was unknown.
236 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 5,
237 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3) (requiring notice "within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for
service of the summons and complaint"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (providing for service within 120
days after filing of the Complaint).
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intended targets of that lawsuit. This is precisely where the analytical
focus should be, given the intimate connection between statutes of
limitations and relation back and given that notice to the defendant is
the ultimate theoretical touchstone of both.23 8 Indeed, the framers of the
1966 amendment argued that relation back should be proper whenever
the to-be-added defendant was placed on notice of the claim within the
239
required period.

Notice demands that the trial court, in deciding whether to permit
an amended pleading to relate back, engage in a discretionary, factintensive inquiry as to what the intended defendant knew about the
filing of the lawsuit and his potential role in that lawsuit and when he

knew it.240 Notice in turn demands that the plaintiff plead the John Doe
defendant with some level of specificity, describing who the individuals
were, what they did, and the time, place, and manner in which events
occurred. 24 1 The key, Carol Rice argues, is that the Complaint should
enable someone familiar with the events at issue, particularly John Doe
himself, to recognize John Doe.242
Courts also may continue to impute notice from the government
entity or supervising officers to the individual rank-and-file officers.
Imputation occurs most frequently when the government and the
individual officers share counsel, as generally occurs in § 1983
actions. 243 An identity of interest between the government and
238 See Bauer, supra note 42, at 731 (arguing that the purpose of Rule 15(c) is "to ensure that
an action should proceed if the intended defendant receives timely notice of the nature and
pendency of the action"); Cooper, supra note 20, at 3 (arguing that the two types of notice under
Rule 15 respond to the two major purposes of statutes of limitations); Ochoa & Wistrich, supra
note 99, at 487 (arguing that the policy of placing plaintiffs and defendants on equal footing, by
providing the defendant with effective notice of the claim and the opportunity to protect his
interests, shapes the limitations system, including the doctrine of relation back); Rice, supra note
16, at 947 ("[T]he federal court in most cases must insist that the defendant have had timely
notice that he is the intended defendant."); see also Singletary, 266 F.3d at 194 ("Notice is the
main issue .... "); see discussion supra notes 86-92, 98-105 and accompanying text.
239 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's notes to 1966 Amendment (stating that
relation back should be proper where the government defendant had knowledge of the institution
of the action); see also Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 99, at 487 (arguing that relation back of
amendments depends "upon a showing that the plaintiff has in some effective manner placed the
defendant on notice of the claim").
240 See Rice, supra note 16, at 928 (arguing that timely notice requires a factual determination
in each case).
241 See id. at 948-49 (arguing for Doe pleadings that distinguish the intended defendant in
some way, including descriptions of the conduct at issue).
242 See id. at 948 ("The key is to put the intended defendant on notice, if he were to read the
complaint, that he is John Doe."); see discussion supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
243 See Jefferies, supra note 23, at 50-51 (noting policies of most state and local governments
to defend civil rights suits against officers, but stating that officers often distrust the government
attorney and seek to use their own counsel); see Singletary, 266 F.3d at 166 (endorsing shared
attorney method of imputing notice); Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1998)
("[Niotice may be imputed to the new party through shared counsel.") (citations omitted).
Compare Jacobsen, 133 F.3d at 320 (holding that same-counsel test satisfied where the original
Complaint was served on City Attorney, who represented City and named officers and would
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individual officers also may provide a basis for imputing knowledge,
where the interests of both are so closely related that the institution of
244
the action against one provides notice to the other.
Moreover, the entity defendant must, prior to responding to the
Complaint via an Answer or pre-Answer motion to dismiss, conduct a
reasonable investigation of the facts alleged in the Complaint and of its
planned admissions, denials, and defenses. 24 5 Most responses or
defenses must consider what actually happened during the occurrence in
question, requiring that the government's attorney communicate with
the officers involved and learn their version of events and their
explanation for their conduct. The government's attorney likely will
show the officers a copy of the Complaint and the specific facts alleged
by the plaintiff, including any detailed descriptions of the Doe officer
defendants. This discussion and interview, which certainly should
occur within 120 days of the filing of the Complaint (since the
government ordinarily has only twenty days to respond to the
Complaint), provides the to-be-added officer defendants with much of
the informal notice required under Rule 15(c)(3)(A). In Mrs. Hall's

have represented newly named officers), with Singletary, 266 F.3d at 196-97 (holding that shared
counsel does not satisfy notice requirements when counsel's representation of the intended
defendant did not commence within the 120-day period set in Rule 15(c)(3)); see discussion
supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
244 See Singletary, 266 F.3d at 197 (citation omitted); Jacobsen, 133 F.3d at 320; Cox v.
Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that imputed knowledge doctrine applies
only where newly added defendants were officials of the originally named entity defendant); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Committee's note to 1966 Amendment (emphasizing that
Secretary had notice of social security action when government or agency named as defendant).
But see Singletary, 266 F.3d at 199-200 (holding that non-management employee does not share
identity of interest with government entity).
The identity-of-interest standard does not fit comfortably with the substantive structure of §
1983. Certainly both the entity and the individual will share some defenses, such as arguing that
events did not transpire as the plaintiff described them or that the plaintiff was not deprived of
any constitutional rights. But the overlap is not the same as if government simply were liable for
its employee's misconduct. Rather, defenses will diverge as each party attempts to shift some
amount of blame. The government may argue that, even if the officer did deprive the plaintiff of
his constitutional rights, the government is not responsible because the officer acted as a rogue
individual, not pursuant to any policy, custom, or failure on the part of the government. See
Gilles, supra note 2, at 32 (arguing that the current municipal liability regime permits the
government to seek refuge in a "bad apple theory"); Jefferies, supra note 23, at 49 (arguing that
where suit against the entity is not available, liability shifts to individual officers). Meanwhile,
the individual officers likely will attempt to argue that they were acting according to policy or
custom, at least sharing liability with the entity.
245 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (requiring that party filing pleading or motion certify that it made
"an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(2) (requiring that claims,
defenses, and legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extension of law) Fed. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(4) (requiring that the "denials of factual contentions are
warranted on the evidence, or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of
information or belief"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b) ("A party shall state in short and plain terms the
party's defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the
adverse party relies.").
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case, for example, the officers may argue that Robert Hall reached for a
gun as he got out of the car.2 46 Once the officers learn of the lawsuit
arising from a particular incident or set of facts in which they were
involved, they should understand that a plaintiff would want to identify
247
and proceed against them.
An expanded understanding of Rule 15(c)(3) should be more
effective under the 2000 amendments to Rule 26(a), which require that
all parties immediately and without request exchange the names of
individuals likely to have discoverable information that the defendant
may use to support its defenses. 248 The individual officers should be
witnesses possessing information supporting most defenses that the
249
government will assert, requiring that their names be disclosed.
Moreover, plaintiffs counsel likely will notify government counsel that
individual officers are target defendants, which should prompt
government counsel to discuss the Complaint with the officers, thereby
providing informal notice. In any event, the names of the officers will
be revealed through ordinary discovery, since the officers' names and
the subject of their testimony will be relevant to the claims and defenses
in the action.250

b.

Some Problems with Relying On Rule 15

Ultimately, amending or re-interpreting mistake in Rule
15(c)(3)(B) is appealing, but will not resolve the problem of John Doe
pleading in § 1983 and Bivens cases. A Rule 15 approach is effective
only to the extent that the plaintiff has some known entity or individual
which she can name and serve as a proper defendant in the original
Complaint along with specifically described Doe defendants. 25 1 That
named defendant likely will be the relevant government entity, such as
Baker County, or a known supervisory officer, such as the Sheriff of
Baker County.
However, as a practical matter, the option of suing the government
entity will not be available in most actions. The government cannot be
named as a defendant in any case involving unconstitutional conduct by

246 See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 93 (1945); Bracey, supra note 1, at 711.
247 See Donald v. Cook County Sheriffs Dep't, 95 F.3d 548, 557 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[P]ublic
officials are charged with the knowledge that they are the appropriate targets of § 1983 suits.").
248 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
249 See discussion supranotes 181-88 and accompanying text.
250 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party .... ").
251 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 5 ("[T]here will be cases where the defendant has a claim
against an identifiable adversary strong enough to meet the Rule 11 test, and can proceed to
attempt to use discovery to identify the more important defendants.").
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federal- or state-level actors.252 A municipal or county government may
be sued, but its liability has been so circumscribed that suing the
government likely is futile. As Myriam Gilles argues, an allegation of
failure to train or supervise generally does not fit the underlying facts,
because in the "vast majority of constitutional wrongs, it is simply not
true that additional training (or other measures, such as improved hiring
or supervision practices) would have prevented the injury. ' 253 As a
general rule, the official action model for municipal liability fails to
254 Most
capture most unconstitutional conduct of lower-level officials.
unconstitutional acts are not necessarily committed by rank-and-file
officers with a history of similar past actions of which supervisors or
255
policymakers were aware.
The reality of the § 1983 landscape is that the government entity,
even a county or local government, rarely will be responsible for its
officers' unconstitutional conduct; the locus of ultimate liability remains
on individual rank-and-file officers.2 56 It follows that the officer likely
will be the sole defendant at the pleading stage.257 The entity is,
ultimately, involved not because it might be legally responsible for the
violation of the plaintiffs rights, but only for purposes of answering
discovery as to the identities of the more important individual officers
who might be responsible. Pleading rules permit a plaintiff to name as a
party defendant only those individuals or entities whom she has a good258
faith basis for arguing might bear legal liability for her injuries.
But without a known entity to sue at the outset, there is no way for
a plaintiff to sue John Doe or utilize relation back. A plaintiff cannot
properly commence the action against John Doe alone.' 5 9 If the only
252 See discussion supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
253 See Gilles, supra note 2, at 44.
254 See id.at 41. It is worth noting one change to Screws v. United States in setting out the
guiding scenario for this Article. Screws was, in fact, the Sheriff of Baker County, the final
policymaker for the County in law enforcement matters, whose unconstitutional actions in the
arrest, beating, and death of Mr. Hall would bind the County. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of
Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 408 (1997). If Screws is the Sheriff (rather than a
Deputy, as in our scenario), Mrs. Hall's municipal liability claim is on firmer footing, because
one of the officers involved in the violation is himself the County policymaker.
255 See id.
at 39.
256 See Brown, supra note 6, at 1507 (arguing that in the ordinary case "any action for
damages will proceed only against the errant police officer"); Gerhardt, supra note 6, at 670
("[T]he Court has gone to great lengths to fit the individual tort model to its analysis in municipal
liability cases ....); Jefferies, supra note 23, at 59 ("[T]he exception of municipal liability is
exactly that-a narrow deviation from the generally applicable rule of liability based on fault.");
see discussion supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
257 See Jefferies, supra note 23, at 59 (arguing that the § 1983 liability regime forces civil
rights plaintiffs to sue state officers rather than states themselves).
258 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(3) (requiring that pleadings "have evidentiary support" or "are
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery").
259 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 5 (citing Petition of Ford, 170 F.R.D. 504 (M.D. Ala. 1997))
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defendant is unknown, there is no one on whom to serve the Complaint;
without service, discovery obligations are not triggered. Only parties
are involved with Rule 26(a) initial disclosures and those disclosures

cannot be made until the plaintiff and served defendants confer to
discuss and develop a proposed plan for conducting discovery. 260 No
discovery of information from any source will occur, without a court
order, until that discovery conference. 261 In short, a plaintiff cannot use
discovery to identify the target officers unless some known named
defendant is served with the Complaint and given the opportunity to

appear, file a responsive pleading or motion, and participate in the early
stages of discovery.
There are three ways in which a plaintiff arguably might sue John
Doe only and still be able to learn those defendants' true identities.

Each might work with broader relation back under an amended or reinterpreted mistake clause. 262 None, however, functions effectively
enough in all civil rights actions.
First, a plaintiff could follow the course in Bivens, where the
plaintiff named only "Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal

Bureau of Narcotics," 263 not the United States or a federal agency; he
got away with it when the district court ordered the Complaint served
on "those federal agents who it is indicated by the records of the United
States Attorney participated in the. .. arrest of the [plaintiff]," resulting
in service on five agents. 264 Most plaintiffs do not get this much help
from the district court. 265 In any event, it would be unwieldy for a
district court to do this in every unknown-defendant § 1983 action.
Making this practice the systemic norm would shift responsibility for
service of the summons and Complaint from the plaintiff266 to the
(recognizing that most federal courts do not permit a plaintiff to sue only a pseudonymous
defendant as a basis for invoking discovery to find a real defendant).
260 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (providing for disclosures within fourteen days of a discovery
between the plaintiff and all parties served with the Complaint); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (setting
forth requirements of discovery conference between parties, including need to agree as to scope
and timing of discovery); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee's notes to 1993
Amendments ("A major purpose of the revision [to the rule on mandatory disclosures] is to
accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case and to eliminate the paper work
involved in requesting such information .... ).
261 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) ("Except... when authorized... by order.... a party may not
seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f).").
262 See discussion supra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
263 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
264 See id at 390 n.2; see also Rice, supra note 16, at 887 ("Only by filing suit against
'unknown' defendants was Bivens able to identify, through court order, his alleged wrongdoers
by their proper names."); ef King v. One Unknown Fed. Corr. Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 912 (7th
Cir. 2000) (plaintiff sued Unknown Corrections Officer after in camera review of prison records,
court ordered Complaint served on particular officers).
265 See Rice, supra note 16, at 897.
266 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1) ("The plaintiff is responsible for service of summons and

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25:2

district court and, as in Bivens, to a government entity that is not an
actual party to the action. Courts likely will be reluctant to assume this
task.
Second would be a variation on the Bivens approach. A plaintiff
could file a Complaint naming only Sheriffs Deputies John Doe 1-3 as
defendants, but not serve it on anyone at the outset (she has 120 days to
effect service 267), then move immediately for a court order permitting
her to seek non-party discovery from the government. 268 The plaintiff,
pursuant to a discovery subpoena, may depose the government entity to
learn the names of the officers whom government records indicate were
involved in the incident at issue or request production of government
records on this point. 269 The plaintiff must show good cause for this

early discovery, although the need to discover the responsible
defendants in order to serve the Complaint should be sufficient.
Assuming that the government responds to the discovery requests in
reasonable time, the plaintiff then could amend her pleading as a matter
of right to name the now-known officers as defendants. 270 The
Amended Complaint, naming the responsible officer defendants only, is
served on those officers and becomes the controlling, timely filed
pleading.
This option avoids the problem of a plaintiff suing a likely nonliable known party solely to use it as a discovery source.2 71 But it
demands closer-than-usual judicial involvement in the early stages of
discovery.
A court must order non-party discovery before any
defendant has been served, much less appeared in the case or conferred
with the plaintiff as to the scope and manner of discovery. This runs
counter to the tenor of party-managed early disclosure and discovery,
which depends on a cooperative exchange of information relevant to
claims or defenses at the outset of litigation, controlled by the parties
272
and without judicial intervention.
complaint within the time allowed .... ").
267 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
268 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (permitting discovery prior to the parties' discovery conference
on order of the court).
269 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C) (providing that non-party discovery subpoena shall
"command each person to whom it is directed to attend and give testimony or to produce and
permit inspection and copying of designated books, documents or tangible things").
270 Because the initial Complaint against John Doe was not served, no responsive pleading
was filed or served. The plaintiff retains her one amendment as a matter of course. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a) ("A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served ....
").
271 Such an approach has been used in many defamation actions against anonymous Internet
speakers. The ISP is not liable for the defamatory speech of its users, thus defamed companies
sue the unknown speaker as John Doe, then subpoena the ISP as a non-party to compel it to
reveal the names and addresses of its members and users. See Lidsky, supranote 150, at 872.
272 As Professor Resnik explained:
Unless and until one of the parties requested some sort of judicial action (granting a
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Moreover, there is no guarantee that the individual officers would
receive the required Rule 15(c)(3) notice of the action and their role in
it, which calls this approach into question. The government, in order to
respond to a non-party discovery subpoena, need not communicate with
the officers or inform them of the lawsuit. This contrasts with the
government's obligation as a party defendant to investigate claims and
defenses prior to responding to a pleading, which almost certainly
entails some discussion with the officers involved. 273 There is a chance
that the officers will learn of the action through the media, the rumor
mill, or other informal means, but no certainty.
Third, one perhaps could argue that a § 1983 plaintiff should be
able to serve a Deputy John Doe Complaint on the relevant government
entity (even if the entity is not a party to the action) or on the
government attorney. The final paragraph of Rule 15(c)(3) provides
that service of process on, inter alia, the United States Attorney,
Attorney General's designee, Attorney General of the United States, or
on an agency or officer who would have been a proper defendant if
named, satisfies the notice requirements with respect to the United
States or any agency or officer to be brought in as a defendant.2 74 In
other words, service on the government or its attorney establishes notice
to the Secretary who should have been sued.
That provision was geared towards a particular class of casesocial security benefits actions, in which, although the Secretary was the
proper named party defendant under controlling law, the plaintiff named
the United States, the Social Security Administration, or some other
improper defendant. 275 The Secretary stood in the precise shoes of the
United States and the agency; the action at issue was one to recover
benefits wrongfully denied by someone acting in a decision making
capacity on behalf of the agency, which benefits would be paid from the
federal treasury. Naming a defendant other than the Secretary departed
from the formalities demanded by Congress in creating the cause of
action,2 76 but everyone at the top of the agency knew that the action had
motion for summary judgment, a date for trial, a pretrial conference), most judges did
not intervene during the pretrial stage. The parties might undertake discovery,
negotiate settlement, or let the case lie dormant for years-all without judicial scrutiny.
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 8, at 384; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory

Committee's notes to 2000 Amendments (describing amendments to Rule 26 creating two types
of discovery, narrower "party-controlled discovery" and broader "court-controlled discovery");
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of
FederalCivil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REv. 13, 17 (2001) [hereinafter Rowe, Square Peg].
273 See discussion supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
274 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3); Brussack, supra note 16, at 676; Lewis, supra note 16, at
1517.
275 See Brussack, supra note 16, at 671; see discussion supra notes 93-97 and accompanying

text.
276 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000) (granting federal court jurisdiction to hear appeals from
denial of social security benefits, where Secretary is named as defendant and applicant files
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been filed and what it was about-judicial review of the administrative
decision.
There is no such clarity or connection under current § 1983
doctrine. The potential legal responsibility of the individual officer is
distinct from that of the government. The presumptive constitutional
case has the officer exercising power conferred by state law, but acting
entirely on his own in causing the constitutional deprivation. 277 Unlike
social security cases, there is no liability overlap between the entity and
the individuals. 278 Simple service on the government alone cannot be
presumed to confer notice to a rank-and-file officer of the filing of the
action or of his role in it. Rather, the officer obtains notice through an
additional step-actual discussion with higher officials or attorneys in
which the officer is shown the Complaint, told of its contents, or asked
to give his side of the story. That additional step need not and may not
occur when the government is merely a non-party discovery source.
And we cannot infer notice under the last part of Rule 15(c) in these
circumstances.
Finally, more generally, exclusive reliance on Rule 15 to handle
John Doe cases demands a discretionary, fact-intensive determination
by the district court as to what the target defendants knew about the
institution of the lawsuit and their role in that lawsuit, when they knew
it, and whether or not they will be prejudiced.2 79 This drags the court
into what Harold Lewis calls "procedural litigation, '280 satellite
litigation of ancillary issues, such as notice, that consume litigation
resources, cause delay, and ultimately turn on complicated and
discretionary factual determinations by the district court that create a
28
risk of inconsistent or divergent results across cases. '
c.

Mrs. Hall's Action Under Rule 15(c)

Mrs. Hall does have one of the actions that will benefit from a new
appeal within 60 days).
277 See Gilles, supra note 2, at 31-32.

278 The fact that the government, by contract, defends and indemnifies the officers does not
create this overlap in liability nor does it impose a duty on the government to notify the officers
of the lawsuit.
279 See Rice, supra note 16, at 928 ("[T]imely notice requires a factual determination in each
case.").

280 See Lewis, supra note 16, at 1559.
281 See Bone, supra note 52, at 918 ("To be sure, trial judges are better informed about
individual cases, but vesting broad (and essentially unreviewable) discretion in the trial judge
undermines predictability and consistency and raises its own legitimacy concerns."); Lewis,
supra note 16, at 1560 (criticizing decisions that turn on "complicated, unprincipled 'balancing'
of multiple weighted factors"); Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 45, at 548 ("I am deeply
skeptical of the capacity of individual judges to craft rules on a case-by-case basis.").
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interpretation of or amendment to Rule 15(c)(3). Because her lack of
knowledge or ignorance as to Screws, Kelley, and Jones is either
28 2
or a
included in "mistake" under the reinterpreted current language
283
the court will turn to
permissible element under an amended rule,
notice, of what Screws, Kelley, and Jones knew about the lawsuit and
when they knew it.
At the outside, Screws,
Notice requirements were satisfied.
Kelley, and Jones were served with Mrs. Hall's Motion for Leave to
Amend, which contained a copy of the proposed Amended Complaint
naming all three as defendants, on the 120th (and final) day after
initiation of the lawsuit, which provides sufficient notice. 28 4 Mrs. Hall
learned the officers' names primarily because the early steps of
litigation moved relatively quickly. Baker County filed its Answer
quickly and was forthcoming with Rule 26(a) disclosures. The attack
on Robert Hall and the resulting lawsuit perhaps received some media
attention, from which the three would learn that a lawsuit had been filed
arising from an incident in which they knew they were involved.
Counsel for Baker County represents the three officers, permitting
the imputation of notice. The defendants likely read a copy of the
original Complaint, which contained sufficient descriptions of the
unknown defendants to permit Screws, Kelley, and Jones to know that
each is John Doe. Having received notice that a § 1983 lawsuit against
some described officers had been filed, they should have been on notice
that they are proper targets of that lawsuit. Finally, the County filed an
Answer within fifty days of the original Complaint being served, which
necessarily means the County reasonably investigated the incident
within that time, which should have included discussions with Screws,
Kelley, and Jones, from which the officers received notice of the action,
its subject matter, and their status as target defendants.
Either of the proposed changes to the mistake clause forces the
district court to grapple with notice, the real issue underlying statutes of
limitations and relation back. Given the substantial amount of informal
notice the officers received, Mrs. Hall should be able to relate back her
Amended Complaint under an expanded Rule 15(c)(3).
But this case may be the exception rather *than the rule. Many
things worked in her favor. Most importantly, the defendant officers
did not represent state or federal governments, providing Mrs. Hall with
a suable entity in the first instance. Service of the Complaint was
executed quickly. Baker County answered (which, of course, required
that it investigate, thus providing the officers with notice) reasonably
282 See discussion supra notes 222-34 and accompanying text,
283 See discussion supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
284 See Rice, supra note 16, at 930 n. 172 ("The motion itself serves as notice of the lawsuit
and unequivocally puts the new defendant on notice that he is an intended defendant.").
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quickly. Baker County revealed the names of the three officers as part
of its Rule 26(a)(1) mandatory disclosures, understanding the three as
having information supporting the County's defenses. Other discovery
was conducted expeditiously. And the court's discretionary factual
determinations went in Mrs. Hall's favor. Procedural facts are not
always so favorable and service, pleading, disclosure, and discovery do
not always go so smoothly. Change any or all of those factual
circumstances and relation back might be denied. A more-expansive
Rule 15(c) thus is a less-than-complete answer to the problem of John
Doe pleading in § 1983 actions.
D.

ChangingProcedure:Pre-FilingDiscovery

An amended or reinterpreted Rule 15(c)(3)(B) resolves the John
Doe problem in actions involving claims against county- and local-level
actors where there is a viable Monell claim, subject to the fact-intensive
notice inquiry, as well as to the vagaries of service, pleading, disclosure,
and discovery. However, the problems and limitations inherent in
relation back make it insufficient, standing alone, to handle all
constitutional actions involving Doe defendants from all levels of
government. There remain a substantial number of cases in which no
government entity or supervisory officer is available as a proper party
defendant or is so unlikely to be liable under the facts that suing that
285
entity or supervising officer would be futile.
An entirely different solution, one that avoids the substantive
difficulties in constitutional damages actions, utilizes some limited prefiling discovery mechanism. A plaintiff could-prior to commencing a
lawsuit and with judicial oversight--determine the identities of the
individual officer defendants, who then could be named in the timely
original Complaint. The government entity need never be brought into
the action as a party, but may be used exclusively as a non-party source
of limited discovery for one piece of information-the identities of the
relevant officers-obtained prior to commencing the lawsuit.
1.

Creating a New Procedure

No general pre-filing discovery mechanism exists under the
Federal Rules. 286 But there is Rule 27, which permits a plaintiff who
285 See discussion supra notes 252-61 and accompanying text.
286 See James A. Pike & John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery, 38 COLUM.
L. REv. 1179, 1192 (1938) [hereinafter Pike & Willis, Deposition-Discovery]("Rule 26 makes no
provision for discovery by the plaintiff before pleading.") (emphasis in original); James A. Pike

2003]

A STUDY IN SECTION 1983 PROCEDURE

853

anticipates bringing a lawsuit, but presently is unable to do so, to take
the deposition of a non-party witness for the purpose of perpetuating
that testimony for use once the action is filed.287 A district court must
order the deposition if it is satisfied that "the perpetuation of the
testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice. . . ."288
The purpose of Rule 27, one court has suggested, is "'not the
determination of substantive rights, but merely the providing of aid for
the eventual adjudication of such rights in a suit later to be begun,'"
thus "it is designed to 'afford a simple ancillary or auxiliary remedy to
which the usual federal jurisdictional and venue requirements do not
apply.' ' 289 The underlying theory is that when some evidence or
information is in the hands of a non-party to a contemplated action and
that evidence or information is essential to the ultimate success of the
contemplated action, the potential plaintiff should, in the interest of
justice, have the opportunity to obtain that information prior to filing.
For a § 1983 plaintiff, the essential information is the names of the
individual officers who may have violated the Constitution.
The prevailing understanding of Rule 27 is that it is to be used only
to perpetuate known evidence, testimony, or information, not to
discover new information. 290 Courts have gone one step further by
& John W. Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 297, 321 (1940)
[hereinafter Pike & Willis, Federal Discovery] ("[D]iscovery might not be used as a direct aid in
drawing a complaint."); Rice, supra note 16, at 896 n.39 ("Filing suit is a prerequisite to the
ability to conduct discovery.").
287 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1) ("A person who desires to perpetuate testimony regarding any
matter that might be cognizable in any court of the United States may file a verified petition in the
United States district court in the district of the residence of any expected adverse party.");
Application of Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione, 198 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Rule
27 is a means of perpetuating testimony before trial."). The rule establishes five elements that the
petitioner must establish in order to take a Rule 27 deposition:
1, that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action cognizable in a court of the
United States but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought, 2, the subject
matter of the expected action and the petitioner's interest therein, 3, the facts which the
petitioner desires to establish by the proposed testimony and the reasons for desiring to
perpetuate it, 4, the names or a description of the persons the petitioner expects will be
adverse parties and their addresses so far as known, and 5, the names and addresses of
the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony which the petitioner
expects to elicit from each ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(1); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
288 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3); Deiulemar Compagniadi Navigazione, 198 F.3d at 486; Penn
Mit. Life Ins., 68 F.3d at 1375.
289 Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione, 198 F.3d at 484 (citing Mosseller v. United States,
158 F.2d 380, 382 (2d Cir. 1946)).
290 See Deiulemar Compagnia di Navigazione, 198 F.3d at 485 ("Rule 27 is not a substitute for
broad discovery, nor is it designed as a means of ascertaining facts for drafting a complaint .... ")
(citations omitted); Pike & Willis, FederalDiscovery, supra note 286, at 321 ("[T]he committee
did not intend the rule to be 'misused' as a means of discovery."); Pike & Willis, DepositionDiscovery, supra note 286, at 1193 ("Historically the bill for perpetuation of testimony was not
regarded as a mode of discovery and could not be used for that purpose."); id. (discussing
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demanding a showing that evidence or testimony will be lost or
unavailable by the time litigation has commenced if not preserved
through the Rule 27 deposition. 29 1 By definition, questions directed at
the government or a high-ranking government official about the identity
of the responsible rank-and-file officers would entail discovery of new
information. Moreover, the information at issue, the name of the
officer, is unlikely to be lost over time without the deposition. The
plaintiffs timely claim against that officer might be lost, but not the
information itself.
At the same time, the information sought here is a different type of
new information. Mrs. Hall is not trying to discover facts in order to
frame her complaint. 292 She is not using Rule 27 to conduct a factual
fishing expedition. She is not trying to determine whether or not she
has a possible constitutional cause of action; she already knows she
does. She knows the basic what, when, and where of the events leading
to her husband's death, at least for Rule 8(a)(2) pleading purposes. She
even knows and can describe a skeletal "who"-some officer or officers
working for Baker County, on duty on May 10, who effected her
husband's arrest, beat her husband, were involved in or present at the
arrest and beating, or who left him unconscious on the floor of a jail cell
to die. The plaintiff in some cases could pick the target officer
defendant out of a police line-up. She needs pre-filing discovery only to
fill one gap in who--his proper name-a gap that she cannot fill in any
other manner.
A plaintiff perhaps could use current Rule 27 to obtain the
necessary information. Certainly, pre-filing discovery of the officer
defendant's identity will "prevent a failure or delay of justice," given
comments of former Attomey-General William Mitchell, a member of the Rules Committee,
insisting that the "Committee 'wanted to prevent the misuse of his perpetuation of testimony rule
as a means of discovery"'); Rice, supra note 16, at 896 n.39 (arguing that Rule 27 allows prefiling discovery "only in extraordinary circumstances to preserve evidence but not to conduct
general discovery to support a complaint"); Rowe, Square Peg, supra note 272, at 19 n.22
(stating that Rule 27 has been interpreted not to be used as a method of discovery to determine
whether a cause of action exists and, if so, against whom that action should be instituted; such use
is viewed as an abuse of the rule).
291 See Penn Mut. Life Ins., 68 F.3d at 1375 ("The age of a proposed deponent may be relevant
in determining whether there is sufficient reason to perpetuate testimony. Advanced age certainly
carries an increased risk that the witness will be unavailable by the time of trial."); id. at 1374-75
(stating that petitioner had not satisfied requirements for Rule 27 deposition where it offered no
evidence regarding the deponent's age or health); see also DeiulemarCompagniadi Navigazione,
198 F.3d at 486 (approving, under Rule 27, a petition seeking to preserve evidence of the present
condition of a ship that was undergoing repairs and was scheduled to leave United States waters).
But see Nicholas A. Kronfeld, Note, The Preservationand Discovery of Evidence under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure27, 78 GEO. L.J. 593, 598 (1990) (arguing that cases on which Rule 27
drafters relied recognized that delay could cause a failure of justice, irrespective of the condition
of the witness).
292 But see Kronfeld, supra note 291, at 594 (recommending that courts interpret Rule 27 to
make discovery mechanisms freely available to help frame a complaint).
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that the consequences to the plaintiff of not being able to plead and
proceed against the named officers in a timely manner will be the loss
of any opportunity to obtain compensation for the constitutional
deprivation. 293

Arguably, identifying the officers prior to filing does

perpetuate their names, in the sense of causing the information about
their names to endure or to be continued indefinitely.
The better solution is a new tailored procedure, modeled on Rule
27, expressly permitting a potential plaintiff to obtain an order from a
district court granting leave to depose someone with knowledge
(namely, the government entity speaking through a designated official

with knowledge) for the sole and limited purpose of identifying the

294
unknown individuals who might be responsible party defendants.

293 See Pike & Willis, Deposition-Discovery, supra note 286, at 1193 ("A liberal attitude
toward the prevention of a 'failure or delay of justice' might expand this remedy to include
discovery before pleading."); see discussion supra notes 18-20, 106-49 and accompanying text.
294 The proposed rule could be Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.1, 27.1, or a new part of current Rule 27, or
it could be enacted as a stand-alone procedural statute, promulgated not by the Rules Advisory
Committee and Supreme Court absent disapproval by Congress, but by Congress on its own
initiative, with presentment to the President. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 42, at 1059 ("Congress
is moving to reclaim some degree of involvement in the rulemaking process, notwithstanding the
continued broad delegation of rulemaking power to the Court."). The provision would read as
follows:
(a) Petition. A person who expects to bring an action in a court of the United States,
but who lacks knowledge or information concerning the identity of the proper party to
be sued, may file a verified petition in the United States district court in the district of
the residence of any expected adverse party. The petition shall be entitled in the name
of the petitioner and shall show: 1, that the petitioner expects to bring an action in a
court of the United States, but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought
because of a lack of knowledge of the proper identity of the adverse party, 2, a short
and plain statement of the claim, as required by Rule 8(a), that petitioner expects to
bring, 3, a description of the persons whose identities petitioners hopes to learn,
including their roles in the underlying conduct, with particularity, 4, the names and
addresses of the persons or government entities or agencies to be examined, and shall
ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the persons to be
examined, for the purpose of obtaining information about the identities of the persons
who are to be adverse parties in the action.
(b) Order and Examination. If the court is satisfied that a deposition to identify the
individuals who will be adverse parties to the action may prevent a failure or delay of
justice, it shall make an order designating or describing the persons or entities whose
depositions may be taken and specifying the subject matter of the examination as the
names, addresses, and locations of the individuals described in the petition as
potentially liable adverse parties in the petitioner's anticipated action. The court shall
determine whether the depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The depositions may then be taken in accordance with these rules; and
the court may make orders of the character provided for by Rules 34 and 35. If the
person to be examined is a government entity at the federal, state, local, municipal, or
other level, or agency of such government entity, the entity or agency shall designate
one or more individuals who consent to testify on its behalf as to the matters at issue,
as provided in Rule 30(b)(6).
(c) No tolling. Any limitations period shall not be deemed tolled while any petition
under this rule is pending before a district court nor while the petition is pursuing the
deposition.
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This deposition occurs prior to the plaintiff commencing the action.
And it occurs on the assumption that the government entity or official
deposed will not be a party to the eventual action; there will be no need
to sue the government, absent a viable Monell claim.2 95 Having
ascertained the officers' names through the pre-filing mechanism, the
plaintiff will not have to sue Officers John Doe or rely on amendment or
relation back. When she finally commences the civil action by filing
her § 1983 Complaint, she can sue and serve the officers by name. It is
up to the plaintiff, armed with this information, to ensure that the
296
Complaint is timely filed.
The proposed rule imposes requirements similar to those in Rule
27. A petitioner must file the petition in the district court, certifying
that she expects to bring a federal action, but presently is unable to do
so precisely because of her lack of knowledge as to the identities of the
officer defendants. She must describe the conduct and events giving
rise to her potential lawsuit and the officers allegedly involved, again
with sufficient detail to enable the government to recognize who the
target officers are. 297 The court will permit the deposition when it is
satisfied that providing the names of the officers will prevent or delay a
failure of justice, a standard a plaintiff such as Mrs. Hall certainly
meets-she will be able to proceed to a merits determination of her §
1983 action only if she learns the officers' names at the pre-filing stage.
The twin substantive purposes of awarding damages under § 1983 in
such a case-compensating Mrs. Hall and deterring future violations by
these and other officers in Baker County-only can be served if Mrs.
Hall is able to do S0.298
Rule 27 permits the district court to decide whether the deposition
will be taken via oral examination or written interrogatories. 299
Petitioners under the proposed rule would be entitled only to precise
information and the scope of any questions accordingly will be limited
only to the identities of a few relevant individual officers. It may
295 Where the plaintiff has a viable Monell claim under the policy-or-custom requirement or on
a "failure to [blank]" theory, she can sue the government and Officer John Doe, then amend and
relate back under the expanded or amended Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(B). See discussion supra
notes 221-36 and accompanying text.
296 The plaintiff must take care to bring the discovery petition with sufficient time remaining
on the limitations period so that she can await the government's responses and still be able to
timely file the Complaint against the individual officers once she has learned those names. The
pre-filing petition properly is understood as an aspect of the plaintiffs investigative process,
distinct from the filing of the Complaint that initiates the action. Thus, while it is inconsistent
with the statute of limitation to demand early filing of a Complaint, see discussion supra notes
177-97 and accompanying text, it is not inconsistent to demand early pre-filing investigation
under the proposed rule.
297 See Rice, supra note 16, at 947-48; see discussion supra notes 110-13, 241-42 and
accompanying text.
298 See discussion supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
299 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3).
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require no more than a few questions with little or no follow-up,
rendering a costly live deposition unnecessary. The court could order
that the deposition be taken by written questions300 to be answered by
the government through a designated officer having knowledge of the
personnel on duty at that time. The court also could order that the
government produce-at or in lieu of the deposition-incident and
patrol reports, duty logs, or other records identifying the officers
involved in the incident. Either of these steps should address the
argument that pre-filing discovery imposes additional undue costs and
burdens on the government entity by forcing a public official to sit
through a lengthy deposition before an action has even been filed.
The pre-filing discovery rule is written in generally applicable
language, meaning it could be used in a range of cases, in keeping with
the general commitment of the Federal Rules to trans-substantive
procedure. 30' However, the rule is motivated by the disparate impact
the current treatment of relation back has on § 1983 and Bivens
plaintiffs. 30 2 And the procedure is uniquely tailored to, and workable in,
constitutional damages cases. The government likely will be the nonparty target of the discovery petition. The officer is sued because of his
conduct on behalf and in the name of the government; at the same time,
the government will, pursuant to indemnification agreement, bear the
cost of litigation and judgment on behalf of the officer. 30 3 The
governmental discovery source's interests are intimately intertwined
with those of the officer it is asked to identify and the discovery source
has a substantial stake in the outcome of the anticipated litigation.
That close connection between discovery source and defendant is
absent in most other cases. Consider the somewhat analogous example
of a defamation suit brought by a corporation against an anonymous
poster to the Internet. The plaintiff can pursue only the unknown
speaker as defendant, even if the speaker must be sued as John Doe; the
ISP, like a government entity, is immune from liability. 30 4 Corporate
plaintiffs frequently subpoena the ISP as a non-party discovery source
through which to identify the individual who posted the defamatory
statements. 305 That corporate plaintiff might make similar use of the
pre-filing discovery rule, using the ISP as its non-party witness, to
300 For example, "State the name, address, home and work telephone numbers, and badge
numbers of the police officer or officers who arrested, transported, and jailed Robert Hall on the
night of May 10 and who administered, aided in, failed to prevent, and/or were present at the time
of the fatal beating on May 10."
301 See discussion supra notes 43-56, and accompanying text.
302 See discussion supra notes 57-60, 150-74 and accompanying text.
303 See discussion supra notes 171-73, 200 and accompanying text.
304 See Lidsky, supranote 150, at 871-72.
305 See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First
Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 168-69 (2001) (stating that

America Online reported receiving 475 such subpoenas in 2000).
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identify the speaker who then can be sued and served by name in the
timely original Complaint.
But there is no overlap of interests between subscriber and ISP.
There is a contractual or business relationship and the ISP has the
knowledge to identify the subscriber for the potential plaintiff. But
there is no commitment to defend or indemnify and no indication that
the individual speaker was working on behalf, or for the benefit of, the
ISP when she made her allegedly defamatory comments. The ISP lacks
any substantial stake in the outcome of the anticipated litigation against
its subscriber.
2.

Applying the New Procedure

There are several ways to understand the proposed pre-filing
discovery procedure. One is as a pre-commencement version of what
the district court did in Bivens. Faced with a Complaint naming only
unknown defendants (which could not be served on anyone), the court
ordered the United States government to use its records to identify the
officers involved in the incident in question, upon whom the Complaint
then could be served. 30 6 Alternatively, this rule may be seen as a prefiling variation on the model of a filed-but-unserved Doe Complaint
with early, court-ordered non-party discovery of the officers' identities
307
from the government.
The court will order the government, which is not and will not be a
named party to the eventual lawsuit, to reveal the names of the
individual officers whom its records indicate were involved in the
events described in the petition. The difference is that the court issues
the order prior to the plaintiff commencing her lawsuit. The court's role
is to ensure that the plaintiff obtains the necessary information from the
government as an incident to the eventual lawsuit. It then is up to the
plaintiff properly to caption, file, and serve a Complaint naming the
individual officers within the time required by the borrowed state statute
of limitations.
This pre-filing model is preferable in that it establishes a formal
procedure, initiated by petition and permitted under a particularly
applicable judicial standard.
Commencing an action by filing a
Complaint against John Doe alone demands early judicial involvement
either in service or discovery, responsibilities that district courts
306 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
390 n.2 (1971); Rice, supra note 16, at 897; see also King v. One Unknown Fed. Corr. Officer,
201 F.3d 910, 912 (7th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff sued Unknown Corrections Officer; after in camera
review of prison records, court ordered complaint served on particular officer).
307 See discussion supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text.
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generally do not assume or want and that contradict the preference for
party control of the earliest stages of litigation manifested in the Rules
of Civil Procedure. 30 8 A court may be reluctant to permit early
discovery. By contrast, a formalized pre-filing procedure compels the
district court to permit and oversee this limited discovery.
A different way to understand this procedure is as a judicially
monitored Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request. Plaintiffs
may attempt to use FOIA and open records requests to ascertain the
names of individual officers involved in an incident, using the names
obtained through FOIA to frame the Complaint. However, such
requests often are met with long delays, intentional or otherwise, and
plaintiffs face other difficulties in obtaining the necessary information
within the time constraints imposed by the statute of limitations. 30 9 This
renders FOIA unsatisfactory as a sole means of enabling § 1983
plaintiffs consistently to obtain the necessary information.
A good illustration of the pitfalls is using FOIA is in the Seventh
Circuit decision in King v. One Unknown Federal Corrections
Officer.310 In King, a federal prisoner brought a pro se Bivens action,
alleging that an unknown prison guard had failed to protect him from an
attack at the hands of two other inmates. 3 11 Mr. King's first step was to
direct several FOIA requests to the United States Bureau of Prisons,
with little or no success, as the Bureau asserted the sensitive nature of
the documents as a basis for nondisclosure. 3 12 The district court
conducted several in camera inspections of the records, twice reaching
its own determination of who the officer likely was, both times having
the plaintiff himself object that the court had not tapped the correct
guard. 313 In other words, the plaintiff did not know who the guard was,
but he knew who the guard was not. Ultimately, before the plaintiff or

308 See discussion supra note 265-66, 272 and accompanying text.
309 See Mark H. Grunewald, E-FOIA and the "Mother of All Complaints:" Information
Delivery and Delay Reduction, 50 ADM1N. L. REV. 345, 345 (1998) (describing "three-decade
long history of agency delay" in processing FOIA requests as a stark example of the legal
system's tolerance for delay); Eric J. Sinrod, Freedom ofInformation Act Response Deadlines:
Bridging the Gap Between Legislative Intent and Economic Reality, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 325, 328
(1994) ("Given the magnitude of the backlogs and incoming requests faced by agencies... it is
probable that although the renewed administration commitment is an encouraging sign, it will be
as unsuccessful at eliminating backlogs . .
310 201 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2000).
311 See id. at911-12.
312 See id. at 912 n.3 (describing responses to several FOIA requests, one of which identified
thirty-seven pages of relevant documents, only seven of which the Bureau released to the
plaintiff, citing their sensitive nature); id at 912-13 (stating that later in the case the district court
refused to permit one potential attorney for plaintiff to inspect the records and that the Bureau
objected to inspection by another potential counsel for plaintiff).
313 See id at 912-13; cf Resnik, FailingFaith, supra note 45, at 548 (criticizing district court
practices of becoming involved "so deeply in managerial and adversarial events that it
undermines the ability of the judge to adjudicate-should that become necessary").
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his later-retained counsel ever had an opportunity to review the records
or identify a possible proper defendant, the district court sua sponte
3 14
dismissed the action as time-barred.
The proposed pre-filing deposition should avoid many of the
problems that haunted Mr. King. By ordering someone from the
government to submit to an oral or written deposition, the court puts the
onus on the government to present to the plaintiff the name or names of
potentially responsible officers-in Mr. King's case, any officers who
were on duty in that cell block on that date, in Mrs. Hall's case the
officers involved in her husband's arrest, transport, jailing, and death.
The government need not turn over documents that it deems sensitive if
it simply tells the plaintiff in the deposition what she wants to know.
Further, the court retains power under this procedure to compel the
government to release the necessary information through its power to
sanction misconduct in pre-commencement
depositions and
discovery. 315 Finally, by codifying a regime of pre-filing discovery of
singular information, the rules force district courts to exercise their
discretion more to the benefit of potential § 1983 plaintiffs than did the
district court in King. The basic question of "who was on duty when
this alleged violation occurred" will be answered and the plaintiff will
have the opportunity to pursue a meritorious § 1983 claim against those
officers.
One objection to this proposal goes to judicial resources, the
argument that the number of pre-filing petitions, like the number of civil
rights actions, will explode and that such a procedure is subject to
abuse. 3 16 However, it is unlikely that there will be such an explosion of
pre-commencement petitions. There is not likely to be a flood of
petitions seeking to identify the officer and avoid John Doe pleading,
because there is not a flood of John Doe lawsuits. Moreover, the
314 See id at 913. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any complaint against any
officer discovered from a review of the Federal Bureau records would be time-barred and would
not relate back because King did not know the identity of the proper defendant, which is not a
mistake for Rule 15(c)(3) purposes. See id. at 914; see discussion supra notes 125-49 and
accompanying text.
315 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 27(a)(3) (providing that "depositions may then be taken in accordance
with these rules," which includes the power of the court to impose sanctions for violations of the

rules); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b), (d).
316 See Tobias, PublicLaw Litigation, supra note 47, at 287 ("[Mlany perceive that the federal
courts are experiencing a 'litigation explosion.' Important to this perception is the belief that
litigants and lawyers overuse, misuse, and abuse the civil justice system."); see also Brown, supra
note 6, at 1519-20 (describing the concern for the litigation explosion in § 1983 actions, although
doubting the premise of such an explosion); Marcus, Fact Pleading, supra note 61, at 440
("Much ink has already been spilled on the litigation 'boom' and the crisis in the adversary
system, but dramatic increases in litigation are hardly unprecedented."); Resnik, FailingFaith,
supra note 45, at 494-95; Schwab & Eisenberg, supra note 69, at 740 (arguing that studies
suggest that the rate at which constitutional tort cases are filed relative to other cases is lower than
expected).
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procedure will be unnecessary for those plaintiffs who have a truly
viable Monell claim against a local or county government; those
plaintiffs may proceed through Rule 15(c)(3) and relation back. Nor
will it be necessary for prisoner plaintiffs challenging their conditions of
confinement, who must exhaust administrative remedies prior to
proceeding to federal court, and who should learn the names of the
responsible officers through that administrative process. 3 17 The new
mechanism is only for that subset of non-prisoner plaintiffs who cannot
proceed against a governmental entity and must identify individual
officers in order to have an officer defendant against whom to move to a
merits determination.
Further, the petitions themselves should not be difficult for the
court to resolve. They demand only a review of whether the plaintiff
has described a potentially viable § 1983 action against some described
government officers and a determination that discovery will prevent a
failure or delay of justice, along with an order to the relevant
government or agency to choose a designee to sit for a deposition,
answer written questions, or produce documents identifying the officers
described in the petition. Perhaps the court must assess and sanction
any dilatory behavior by the government. But given the straightforwardness of the inquiry, the procedure arguably consumes fewer
judicial resources than the fact-specific and discretionary Rule 15(c)(3)
relation back inquiry into whether the target defendants received
sufficient notice of the action and its subject matter and their roles in the
action within the prescribed time frame. 31 8
The proposed procedure merely shifts the time at which resources
will be consumed. A Rule 15 inquiry occurs after the original
Complaint has been filed, during pleading and discovery as the plaintiff
seeks leave to file an Amended Complaint. The new procedure
consumes judicial resources prior to commencement of the action, as
317 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2003) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section [1983]... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."); Booth v.
C.O. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734 (2001) (holding that an inmate who seeks only money damages
must exhaust an administrative procedure that could not provide monetary relief); id. at 741
("Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered through
administrative procedures."). But see Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's
EnigmaticExhaustion Requirement: What it Means and What Congress, Courts and Correctional

Officers Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 483, 514 (2001) ("It is debatable whether
application of the exhaustion requirement in § 1997e(a) to prisoners seeking damages that cannot
be obtained through the grievance process would further the traditional purposes of exhaustion.");
see also id. at 513 (arguing that one purpose of exhaustion is to promote judicial efficiency); id.at
514 (arguing that exhaustion supports the judicial process by providing a factual record that can
aid the court in process a claim); id. at 506 (stating that the PLRA's broad exhaustion requirement
siphons off potentially frivolous claims from the courts, resolving them within the prison walls,
before they get into federal court).
318 See discussion supra notes 279-81 and accompanying text.
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one small part of the plaintiff's pre-filing investigation, in a simpler
inquiry into whether or not discovery on one narrow point should be
had and whether the government has complied with its duty to answer
one simple question about who was present when Robert Hall was
arrested, transported to the jailhouse, beaten, jailed, and died. By the
time the lawsuit itself is commenced, Mrs. Hall has identified Screws,
Kelly, and Jones. The parties can focus their discovery and litigation
efforts not on pleading and amendment but on the substantive merits:
what happened, whether a deprivation of rights occurred, whether the
officers are entitled to qualified immunity, and what relief the plaintiff
31 9
might obtain.

319 See Marcus, FactPleading,supra note 61, at 439.

